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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS,
LC, a Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiff/ Appellee / Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

v.
CARLOS MARIN,
Case No. 20090875-SC
Defendant / Appellant / Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the 29 January 2010 Order granting the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Petitioner. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5); Utah
R.App.P. 51.
II. NATURE OF THE CASE
This Court granted review of a 24 September 2009 opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals affirming a 26 March 2008 Order of the Fourth District Court (Judge Samuel
McVey) granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Respondent Young
Living Essential Oils, LC (R. 451-462), and the trial court's 12 June 2008 Final Judgment
in favor of Respondent Young Living awarding damages and attorney fees (R. 500-505,
563-565).

1

III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Can the covenant of good faith and fair dealing be used to add new terms
to an expressly integrated written agreement? Can the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing circumvent the parol evidence rule?1 This Court reviews questions of law
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935
(Utah 1994).

This Court reviews the factual determination that an agreement is

integrated under a clearly erroneous standard. Tangren Famly Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT
20 f 11, 182 P.3d 326, 329 (Utah 2008).
2. Are attorney fees issues preserved for appeal where the losing party fails
to timely object?

"To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised 'a

timely and specific objection' before the trial court. We will not address an issue if it is
not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for seeking review."
H.U.F. v. W.P.W.

P.3d

, 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) {quoting State v. Low,

2008 UT 58, If 17, 19, 192 P.3d 867, 880 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (Copy at
Addendum 1).

1

Pursuant to Rule 51(b)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent believes this
statement of the issues was presented or is "fairly included" in the petition for certiorari
(Petition f 1 at 1), and in the issue ordered by the Court for review, to wit: "Whether the
court of appeals erred in its assessment of Petitioner's argument that Respondent
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
Pursuant to Rule 51(b)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent believes this
statement of the issue was presented or is "fairly included" in the petition for certiorari
(Petition ^f 2 at 1), and in the issue ordered by the Court for review, to wit: "Whether the
court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees."

2

Assuming the issue has been preserved, "[t]he standard of review on appeal of [the
amount of] a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of
discretion." Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 189 P.3d 114, f 12 at 118
(Utah App. 2008) (citing Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^J 127, 130 P.2d 325, 328 (Utah
2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah
1998)).
IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES
Summary Judgment - Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Chil Procedure:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Preservation - Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court,
the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity
with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or
upon expiration of the time to object.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 26 July 2006, Plaintiff/Respondent Young Living Essential Oils, LC, a Utah
limited

liability

company

("Young

Living"),

3

filed

its

complaint

against

Defendant/Petitioner Carlos Marin ("Marin"), for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
quantum meruit, fraud, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligent misrepresentation in the Fourth District Court. (R. 1-23).
On 18 December 2006, Marin filed his Amended Answer. (R. 52-63).
On 21 March 2007, Young Living filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Breach of Contract Claim) (R. 74) with a supporting Memorandum and accompanying
affidavits (R. 69-72, 75-105). On 4 April 2007, Marin filed his Response to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 110119), with a supporting affidavit (R. 120-127). On 13 August 2007, Young Living filed
its Reply and Opposition to Defendant's Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(R. 130-170; see also Errata at R. 308-311), with supporting affidavits and declarations
(R. 171-287). On 27 August 2007, Marin filed his Reply (R. 293-295).
At a 1 October 2007 hearing on the motions, the trial court (Judge Samuel
McVey) granted Young Living's motion for partial summary judgment on its contract
claim and denied Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 312). On 26
March 2008, the trial court signed the Order granting Young Living's motion for partial
summary judgment and denying Marin's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (R.
451-462).
On 27 May 2008, Young Living filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its remaining
claims against Marin, filed its affidavit of attorney's fees and costs (R. 463-495), and
submitted a proposed Final Judgment (R. 503-505).

4

On 11 June 2008, Marin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Final Judgment
and Fee Affidavit (R. 496-499).
On 12 June 2008, the trial court entered the Order dismissing Young Living's
remaining claims (R. 500-502) and entered its Final Judgment (R. 503-505).
On 14 July 2008, Marin filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 513-514).
On 24 September 2009, without hearing oral argument and in an unpublished
memorandum decision (Addendum 2), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment. Quoting this Court's opinion in Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons,
Inc., the court of appeals held that, '"[w]hile a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inheres in almost every contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new,
independent rights or duties.'"

Since "no obligation regarding marketing tools was

made a part of the written agreement," the court of appeals rejected "Marin's argument
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be used to incorporate
extrinsic evidence of a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' [written]
agreement was integrated."4
The court of appeals also held that because Marin had failed to timely file an
objection, he had not preserved the attorney fees issue for appeal.5

3

Addendum 2 at 3, quoting Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^f
45, 104 P.3d 1225, 1239 (Utah 2004).
4

Id

5

Id at 3-4.
5

On 26 October 2009, Marin filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On 29 January
2010, this Court granted the petition.
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following undisputed facts are taken verbatim from the district court's 26
March 2008 Order (R. 462-458) except that, pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, "Young Living" replaces "Plaintiff," and "Marin" replaces
"Defendant" here. The "Facts" outlined in paragraphs 12-20 of Petitioner's brief (Pet.
Br. at 6-9) were rejected by the trial court and court of appeals (and were contradicted by
Young Living's submissions at the trial court - see R. 171-287).
A.

Valid Contract
1. After negotiations, Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Young Living")

a Utah corporation, ultimately executed a written agreement ("Agreement") with
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Marin") on 12 January 2005.
2. In their Agreement, Marin expressly represented and warranted that he had
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader," had "numerous contacts with potential
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors
with the Company," and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services
such as the duties as contemplated herein."
3.

Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the

signature blocks, is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part:
"there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein."
6

B.

Young Living's Obligations
4. Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Young Living agreed to pay Marin

advance payments of
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
$25,000 on 15 February 2005;
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and
$25,000 on 15 April 2005.
5. According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance
bonuses were to help Marin devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting
additional distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended
"to entice [Marin] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it.
Also, [they] will provide him with a quick resource of cash tp build the business."
6. Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any
payments due Marin for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses.
7. Under paragraph 4.3, Young Living gave Marin a product credit of $5,000 for
January 2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new
Distributor/Leaders."
C,

Marin's Obligations
8. Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Marin agreed to "devote his full time

and attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Young Living's products.

7

9. Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Marin agreed that he would meet the
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the
specified dates:
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
10. Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Marin's payment of Young
Living's "loss and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention ... of any of the
terms and conditions imposed on [Marin] pursuant to this Agreement."
D.

Young Living's Performance and Marin's Breach
11. On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement,

Young Living paid Marin a $25,000 advance.
12. On 15 February 2005, Marin met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
13.

Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Young Living paid Marin another

$25,000 advance.
14. On 15 March 2005, Marin had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto
ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.

8

15. On 15 March 2005, Young Living paid Marin another $15,000 advance based
on Marin's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee
of $30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005.
16. On 15 April 2005, Marin had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let
alone his 15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance
guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
17. Through June 2006, Marin had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume.
E.

Damages
18. Young Living paid Marin $65,000.00 in advances.
19. In 2005 and 2006, Marin earned a total of $3,^37.57 in commissions from

Young Living.
20. Marin never earned "Fast Cash55 bonus payments,.
21. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the ^monies advanced to [Marin]
will be offset by any payments due [Marin] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated
below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Marin]
each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . .

If any of the

advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payoiits or Fast Cash at the end of
the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from any future commission
payout...."

9

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

Summary judgment.

This case involves an expressly integrated written

agreement. Marin argues that, based on his affidavit submitted in response to Young
Living's motion, his admitted failure to meet agreed-upon performance guarantees was
excused because of Young Living's prior breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline. As a
result, Marin argues, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' opinion affirming the
trial court's judgment in favor of Young Living on its breach of contract claim.
Marin makes two supporting arguments:
(1) He claims he is not attempting through his affidavit to impose new,
independent duties into the parties' Agreement; and
(2) He claims the parol evidence rule is not implicated by his affidavit because the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract. Petitioner's
Brief ("Pet. Br.") 13-22.
Marin's arguments are without merit:
Marin did not offer his affidavit as evidence of the parties' "course of dealing"
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but as extrinsic evidence of an
additional term.
Marin's affidavit thus implicates the parol evidence rule.

While the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract, it may not be used to
establish "new, independent duties" outside the parties' written agreement.

Marin's

reliance on the implied covenant is therefore misplaced. Marin's argument also ignores
10

the undisputed fact that the parties' Agreement contained a clear integration clause. The
court of appeals was thus correct in concluding that under both the parol evidence rule
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing the trial court properly excluded Marin's
affidavit from consideration in granting Young Living's motion for summary judgment.
B. Attorney fees. Marin argues that because the titial court's award of attorney
fees was unconscionable and plainly erroneous, the court of appeals improperly held that
Marin's objection to the award was untimely and he had therefore failed to preserve the
issue for appeal.
The court of appeals was correct in concluding that Marin failed to preserve the
attorney fees issue for appeal. Young Living agrees that it is not entitled to recover
attorney fees related to its tort and other non-contract claims, and in connection with
issues on which it did not prevail.6
VIIL ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, UNDER
EITHER THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING OR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, MARIN'S AFFIDAVIT
WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ADD A NEW
TERM TO THE PARTIES' EXPRESSLY INTEGRATED WRITTEN
AGREEMENT
Marin claims Young Living's prior material breach of its obligation of good faith

and fair dealing excused him from further performance under the parties' Agreement.

6

If Young Living prevails on this appeal, it will submit a revised affidavit of fees to the
trial court excluding $6,754.50 for work in connection with the additional claims in its
complaint and issues on which it did not prevail below. If Young Living does not prevail
on this appeal, the attorney fees issue will be moot.

11

(Pet. Br. 10). As evidence of Young Living's asserted breach, Marin submitted his
affidavit outlining purported conversations with "plaintiff Young Living before he
signed the Agreement and with named individuals affiliated with Young Living after.
Marin contends that he offered his affidavit not for the purpose of proving "new,
independent rights or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral agreement," but to show "the
parties' purpose, intentions and [his] justified expectations." (Pet. Br. 11).
Marin asserts his "justified expectation" was that Young Living would provide
him with "marketing tools" by a specific date. (Pet. Br. 10-11, 13-21). In his affidavit,
Marin asserted:
In order to induce me to enter in to the Agreement, plaintiff [Young Living]
represented to me that it was nearing completion of a new mainstream
marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD, and other marketing
materials (hereinafter referred to as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly
understood by both plaintiff and myself that these marketing tools would be
absolutely necessary for me to be able to meet my performance guarantees
under the Agreement and it was represented to me that they would be
available for use by February 1, 2005.
(Affidavit of Carlos Marin, dated 1 April 2007 ("Marin Affidavit"), paragraph 4; copy
attached as Addendum 3).7
Marin's reliance on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in support of the
admissibility of his affidavit is misplaced for at least three reasons:

7

Marin has never identified the individual (or individuals) who purportedly made these
representations, has not identified where or when they made, except to assert that it was
prior to his signing the Agreement, and has not further described what "other marketing
materials" means. Implicitly acknowledging that his assertions lack the required
particularly, Marin has never claimed fraudulent inducement or fraud in connection with
his entering the Agreement.
12

1. No evidence of "a course of dealing." Marin's affidavit provides no evidence
of "a course of dealing" with Young Living that could have |ustified his expectation that
he would receive "marketing tools" by a specified deiadline; indeed, the signed
Agreement was their first contract and began the "course of dealing" between these two
parties (see, e.g., Marin Affidavit Tf 3; Agreement [R. 120-12?]);.
2. Instead, extrinsic evidence of a new term. Evidence to show a prior oral
agreement about "marketing tools" and representations about when they would be ready
is not "course of dealing" evidence, it is extrinsic evidence of "new, independent rights
and duties" not contained in the parties' subsequent, expressly-integrated written
Agreement; and
3. And a dispositive undisputed fact: a clear integration clause. The clear
o

integration clause directly over Marin's signature in the Agreement forecloses any

The integration clause reads, in pertinent part:
Entire Agreement.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and
contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the Parties, and there
are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties
in connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth
herein. No supplement, modification, amendment, wlaiver or termination of
this Agreement shall be binding unless executed in writing and signed by
the Parties hereto. ...
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement
on the date first written above. ... [Signed] CARLOS! MARIN
(R. 6, copy at Addendum 4). Marin has never even addressed, let alone disputed, this
clear integration clause. See R. 63 ^ 2 and 62 f 5; see dtfso R. 118-119 fflf 1-2; Rule
13

"justified expectation" that he could rely on any "prior agreements and understandings of
the Parties" or any other "representations ... except as specifically set forth" in the
parties' written Agreement.

It also forecloses any "supplement, modification,

amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement ... unless executed in writing and
signed by the Parties hereto."9 Thus, to the extent Marin relies on this Court's opinion in
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998), to extend the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to include "express or implied obligations" or "representations" (Pet. Br. 17-19,
citing id. at 954-55), his signature directly below this clear integration clause forecloses
that in his case.
In sum, although Marin asserts he is relying on the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, he has provided no evidence of any course of dealing on which he could
justifiably rely. The clear integration clause precludes any justified expectation by Marin
that a prior oral agreement or representation was or could be a part of the parties' final
signed Agreement. Since Marin has never disputed or even addressed the integration
clause, the court of appeals' conclusion that the parties' Agreement was integrated was
not clearly erroneous. Because Marin's affidavit seeks to add a new term to an expressly
integrated written agreement, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the parol
evidence rule and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing preclude its admission for

7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 6 \ 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 If 3; R. 118-119
ffl[ 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah R. Civ. P.; cf. R. 21fflf10-11, 14; R. 63 ^ 2 and 62 ^ 5).
9

Thus, any statements in Marin's affidavit about his purported conversations with Young
Living regarding "marketing tools" after he signed the Agreement could not supplement,
modify, or amend its terms.
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that purpose. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT |20 ^f 11, 182 P.3d 326, 330
(Utah 2008) (the parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud or other
invalidating

causes,

to

exclude

evidence

of

contemporaneous

conversations,

representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of
an integrated contract"); Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 ^f 45,
104 P.3d 1226, 1239 (Utah 2004) ("While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inheres in almost every contract, ... this covenant canndt be read to establish new,
independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree"); Andalex Resources, Inc.
v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994) ("the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed
upon by the parties"), citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 8112 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991);
accord Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new,
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties'").
4. The Proper Legal Framework for Analysis.10
This case marks an intersection between a clear Integration clause, the parol
evidence rule, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and summary judgment.
Marin seeks to extend the covenant of good faith and lair dealing so that extrinsic
evidence may be permitted to add an oral term to an expressly integrated written
agreement, or, at a minimum, to create a genuine issue of material fact in summary
judgment.

10

For Young Living's analysis of whether the trial court properly applied this proper
framework, see Young Living's brief at the court of appeals! at 15-19.
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Like the court of appeals, this Court could simply hold that, since it is undisputed
that the parties' Agreement contained a clear integration clause, Marin's affidavit is not
admissible to add new terms to the parties' expressly integrated written agreement. But
this Court's grant of certiorari review also creates an opportunity for the Court to reaffirm
its prior rulings on the following principles:
a. Contract interpretation is a question of law: "[Interpretation of a contract is
a question of law." Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561
(Utah 1983), citing Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah
1983).
b. The threshold question: Is the agreement integrated? Before a trial court
can consider evidence outside the parties' written agreement, it must consider whether
that agreement is integrated. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 % 11, 182
P.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008) ("[f|irst, the court must determine whether the agreement is
integrated"), citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah
1995) (this Court affirmed where trial judge excluded parol evidence offered to add terms
to a written agreement that was complete on its face), citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707
P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
"To determine whether a writing is an integration, a court must determine whether
the parties adopted the writing 'as the final and complete expression of their bargain.'"
Id., quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah
1972) (emphasis added by id.). '"[W]hen parties have reduced to writing what appears to
be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of
16

fraud, that the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the parties.'" Id.
Integration clauses
"are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the courts
that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered completely
integrated. A completely integrated agreement must be interpreted on its
face, and thus the purpose and effect of including |a merger clause is to
preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court
interprets the document."
Id., quoting Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004IUT 70, \ 28, 98 P.3d 15, 25
(Utah 2004).
c. Whether a contract is integrated is a preliminary question of fact for
determination by the court that may be resolved in summary judgment: "Whether a
contract is integrated is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Id. \ 10 at 229 {citing
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, % 20, 144 P.3d 1096, 1103 (Ufeh 2006) ("an appellate court
reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error"); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz,
28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972) ("the courtlmust determine as a question
of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt a particular witing or writings as the final
and complete expression of their bargain"); cf AGIv. First Affiliated Securities, 912 F.2d
1238, 1245 (10 Cir. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where, under Utah law, trial
judge refused to consider parol evidence of purported additional oral terms of expressly
integrated written agreement).
d. "If a contract is integrated, parol evidence is admissible only to clarify
ambiguous terms." Tangren, 2008 UT 20, \ 11, 182 P[3d at 330. Marin has never
claimed that the Agreement was ambiguous.
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e. "[WJhether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed for
correctness." Id, Tj 10 at 229.
f. "If a contract is integrated, parol evidence ... is 'not admissible to vary or
contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract.'" Id., ^ 11 at 330,
quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)
(citations omitted). This holding is dispositive here.
g. "[I]n the face of a clear integration clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate
oral agreement is not admissible on the question of integration." Id., f 17 at 332.
This holding may be limited to the unique facts of the Tangren case: i.e., where the
parties offered extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement that the written agreement was
invalid or subject to a condition precedent. Id., ^ 16 at 331. See discussion under
sections 5 and 6 below.
h. "Extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the face of a clear
integration clause, where the contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham,
lacking in consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake,
or illegality." Id., ^ 15 at 330-31, citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665
(Utah 1985); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. c. None of these apply here
since Marin has limited his claim to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See R. 63 f 2 and 62 f 5; see also R. 118-119 ffif 1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(A) and (B), Utah R.
Civ. P. (R. 6 U 18 (emphasis added); R. 101 U 3; R. 118-119fflf1-2; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah
R. Civ. P.; cf. R. 21fflf10-11, 14; R. 63 | 2 and 62 f 5).
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i. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to add new
terms to a parties' agreement. "While a covenant of good [faith and fair dealing inheres
in almost every contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent
rights or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante." Oakwood Vill. LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^ 45, 104 P.2d 1226, 1239 (ptah 2004); "[T]he covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or
duties not agreed upon by the parties." Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1048 (Utah App. 1994), citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 48, 55 (Utah 1991);
accord Brown, 973 P.2d at 955 ("a contrary holding would 'establish new, independent
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties'"). In tandem| with the parol evidence rule,
this holding is dispositive here.
j. "[T]he degree to which a party to a contract m$y invoke the protections of
the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] turns ^n the extent to which the
contracting parties have defined their expectations and I imposed limitations on the
exercise of discretion through express contract terms." Smith v. Grand Canyon
Expeditions, 2003 UT 57, If 20, 84 P.3d 1154, 1159-60 (Utah 2003), citing Malibu Inv.
Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, ^ 19, 996 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Utal^ 2000).
5. Harmonizing Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren
As noted in the prior section, this case marks an I intersection between a clear
integration clause, the parol evidence rule, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and summary judgment. Because of this, none of the thre$ cases relied on primarily by
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the court of appeals, by Marin, and by Young Living is "on all fours" with the current
case.
Thus, this Court's grant of certiorari review creates an opportunity for the Court to
explicitly harmonize these three cases based on the circumstances presented in this case.
After a review of each of these cases, we will suggest specific proposed holdings the
Court could render to harmonize them here.
a. Court of Appeals: Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc. The court of
appeals relied primarily on Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f
45, 104 P.3d 1226, 1239 (Utah 2004), in upholding the trial court's summary judgment
ruling in Young Living's favor.
Oakwood involved:
•

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (not summary judgment as here);

•

the affirmative use of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
a claim for its breach (unlike Marin's use here as a claimed defense to
breach of contract);

•

no claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has limited his claims to
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing);

•

impliedly (although not explicitly) the parol evidence rule; and,

•

although the Court found the lease in Oakwood to be "a complete and
unambiguous agreement between competent commercial parties," it did
not involve a "clear integration clause" in the contract at issue (unlike here;
cf Tangren; see also Table 1 on page 28, infra).
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Oakwood Village, LLC sued Albertsons, Inc. for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing for continuing to pay for but Inot occupy leased premises,
and opening a competing store. Oakwood, ^J 6 at 1230 and % 42 at 1239. The trial court
dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state ^ claim upon which relief can
be granted, and this Court affirmed.
In affirming, this Court noted that "Oakwood's complaint does not contain
averments regarding the parties' course of dealings or conduct, focusing only on the
contractual language." Id., ^f 43 at 1240.
The Court also noted that it determines the "purpose, (intentions, and expectations"
of the parties by considering "the contract language and the course of dealings between
and conduct of the parties." Id, quoting St. Benedict's Dev. Co., v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991).
The Court concluded that "Oakwood's construction of the obligation to act in
good faith and deal fairly would violate other broader principles of contract
interpretation" (Id, | 44 at 1240), apparently referring to the parol evidence rule. Then
the Court made the statement quoted in part and relied on by the court of appeals in
affirming here:
While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every
contract, some general principles limit the scope of the covenant. ... First,
this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties
to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812
P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). ... [In addition], we will not use this covenant to
achieve an outcome in harmony with the court's sense of justice but
inconsistent with the express terms of the applicable contract. See Dalton
v. Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982)1
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Id., \ 45 at 1249. In support of its holding, the Court noted, "[i]t is not our role to
intervene now, construing the contract's unambiguous terms to mean something different
from what the parties intended them to mean at the outset." Id., f 53 at 1241. The Court
also pointed out,
Oakwood has stated that u[f]airness in business dealings should be a
concern to this Court." It is precisely this concern for fairness, however,
which bars us from reading into the lease an obligation that Oakwood failed
to secure during contract negotiations. The duty Oakwood now seeks to
impose on Albertsons is simply not one for which the parties bargained.
Id., ^J 55 at 1242. The court of appeals cited Oakwood and found it dispositive here.
Young Living believes the last two sentences quoted above have particular application to
Marin's claims.
b. Defendant-Petitioner Marin: Brown v. Moore. In his brief before this Court,
Marin relies primarily on Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998), as suggesting that:
(1) a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing may arise from obligations or representations, express or
implied, which are not found in the language of the contract itself; and (2)
that a cause of action based upon obligations or representations not found in
the language of the contract does not necessarily "establish new,
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties."
(Pet.Br. a t l 9 ) . n

11

Significantly, none of the three "course of dealing" cases cited by Marin in support of
his argument about implied terms (Pet. Br. 19) contained an integration clause. See
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001); Andalex Resources, Inc. v Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1048 (Utah App. 1994); see also Tangren, n.20 at 331.
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Brown involved:
•

summary judgment (as here);

•

the offensive use of the implied covenant off good faith and fair dealing
in a claim for breach of contract (unlike Marin's use here as a claimed
defense to breach of contract);

•

no claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has limited his claims to
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing);

•

impliedly (although not explicitly) the parol evidence rule; but,

•

it did not involve a "clear integration clause" in the contract at issue
(unlike here; see n.l 1, supra at 22; see also1 Table 1 on page 28, infra).

The plaintiffs in Brown sued the defendant for breacjh of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in its contract with plaintiffs when it took possession of a
savings and loan institution they owned. Brown, 973 P.3d at 951. Defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted.| Plaintiffs appealed, arguing
that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment based on its assessment of
breach of the express and implied contractual obligations. This Court affirmed. It noted
that,
[Defendant] emphasizes that plaintiffs cannot identify any representation or
promise on the part of [defendant] which would support a finding of breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, noting the limited contacts
plaintiffs had with [defendant's] representatives prior to executing the
purchase agreement.
Id., at 954. The Court also indicated that, "[i]n determining (whether a party has breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
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we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual provisions;
we will also consider the course of dealings between the parties. [Citations
omitted). However, we will not interpret the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they
made for themselves. [Citations omitted]. Nor will we construe the
covenant "to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by
the parties. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55.
Id. The Court then stated what Marin has quoted in his brief before this Court:
Thus, if plaintiffs are to defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings
between the parties must disclose some other obligation, express or
implied, on the part of [defendant] which could give rise to a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. The Court found that plaintiffs could show no express representation by defendant,
and quoted an opinion letter issued in conjunction with the execution of the agreement
that disclaimed any such representations. Id., at 954-55.
"Thus," the Court concluded, "any assumption by plaintiffs that the [defendant]
had an obligation [plaintiffs claimed] ... was not reasonable" and the lack of "express or
implied obligations of or representations by" defendants was fatal to plaintiffs claim "of a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding," the Court
reasoned, "would 'establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the
parties.'" Id., at 955, quoting Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55.
While it goes the farthest of any Utah case in suggesting that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could extend to "implied obligations" or "representations" by one of
the parties, Brown's holding is unhelpful to Marin, because there was a clear integration
clause in the Agreement Marin signed, specifically excluding implied obligations or
"representations" from the parties' written Agreement.
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Indeed, without a clear

integration clause in Brown, the Court appeared to simply follow its precedent in
considering "all relevant evidence" in determining whether; the parties' agreement was
integrated, and, if not, what terms the parties intended. Hqll, 890 P.2d at 1026-27 (to
resolve the question of integration, any relevant evidence is admissible).
Even though Brown seems to go the farthest in support of Marin's argument, it
stops short. In any event, the dispositive distinction betwe0n Brown and this case is the
clear integration clause Marin signed.
c. Plaintiff-Respondent Young Living: Tangren family Trust v. Tangren. In
its brief before the court of appeals, and before this Court, Young Living relies primarily
on Tangren Famly Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 Tj 11, 182 |>.3d 326, 330 (Utah 2008), in
support of its position that the parol evidence rule precludes admission of Marin's
affidavit.
Tangren involved:
•

a bench trial (unlike summary judgment here);

•

the parol evidence rule (as here);

•

a "clear integration clause" in the contract $i issue (as here); but

•

it did not involve a claim related to the breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing (cf. Oakwood and Brown)', and

In Tangren, this Court disavowed Hall to the extent it was read to "suggest that extrinsic
evidence of a separate oral agreement is admissible where the contract contains a clear
integration clause." Tangren, n.20 at 331 (emphasis in original).
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•

it did not involve a claim of fraud or ambiguity (as here: Marin has
limited his claims to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing)
{see also Table 1 on page 28, infra).

In Tangren, the trustee of the Tangren Family Trust prepared a 99-year lease for
his son to protect his interest in a ranch property. The lease included a clear integration
clause: "Entire Agreement: This Lease contains the entire understanding between the
parties with respect to its subject-matter, the Property and all aspects of the relationship
between Lessee and Lessor."
The relationship between father and son later deteriorated, the son recorded the
lease, and the father demanded payment which the son tendered by way of checks the
father never cashed. Ultimately, the father filed suit for breach of lease and damages for
removal of property. During the bench trial, the father amended his complaint to allege
breach, but also that the lease "did not form a valid contract between the parties because
the conditions upon which it was entered into were never met." The son counterclaimed.
A/., Tflf 2-6 at 327-28.
Both father and son testified that the lease was not intended to be valid between
them, but to protect the son's interest from his siblings.

The trial court agreed,

determined the son had no obligation to pay rent and ordered the son off the ranch. The
son appealed. Id, ffif 7-8 at 328-29.
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the trial court properly considered
extrinsic evidence in assessing whether the lease was an integration, but that it erred in
relying on the father's testimony regarding his intent in creating the lease in the face of a
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clear and unambiguous integration clause in the lease itself. The court of appeals found
that the parties entered into a "valid, integrated, and unambiguous lease agreement" and
remanded for the trial court to determine whether the son breiached the lease.
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in its
assessment of the parol evidence rule. Id., f 9 at 329.
The Court outlined the well-settled principles of the parol evidence rule and the
two-step analysis regarding integration and ambiguity: fnist, the court must determine
whether the agreement is integrated (a question of fact); land, second, the court must
determine whether the language of the agreement is ambiguous (a question of law). If the
court finds an agreement is integrated and its terms are unambiguous, parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary or add to the terms of the agreement, !§., ^ 10-13 at 329-30.
In Tangren, the Court found that the plaintiffs argument "amounts to a contention
that a separate oral understanding overrides the written Lease's clear integration clause.
We reject this argument." Id., \ 14 at 330. The Court further noted,
To argue that the Lease is not the complete agreement of the parties is to
argue in direct contradiction to the clear integration clause. Thus, we will
not allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on
the question of integration in the face of a clear integration clause. To the
extent any of our prior cases provide otherwise, we overrule those cases.
Id., \ 16 at 331. The Court likewise concluded that the court of appeals' consideration of
extrinsic evidence about a separate oral agreement or condition precedent related to the
agreement was improper since the lease contained "a cleiar integration clause": "We
conclude that the Lease is integrated and that its terms are unambiguous. Thus, the parol
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evidence rule bars the admission of all extrinsic evidence regarding the Lease." Id.,% 19
at 332.
Since the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not at issue in
Tangren, the Court did not explicitly extend its holdings to apply where a claimed breach
of that covenant is at issue.
See Table 1 below for a summary comparison of the issues in these cases with the
issues in this case:
Table 1: Summary of Issues: Oakwood, Brown^ and Tangren - and this case

OAKWOOD

BROWN

TANGREN

Y L v . Marin

Relied on by
court of appeals

Relied on by
Marin

Relied on by
Young Living

{This case)

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

"Clear Integration
Clause"

NO

NO

YES

YES

Claim of Fraud

NO

NO

NO

NO

Claim of
Ambiguity

NO

NO

NO

NO

Parol Evidence
Rule

{Implied)

{Implied)

YES

YES

Summary
Judgment

NO

NO

NO

YES

ISSUES/LAW
Offensive Use of
Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair
|
Dealing
Defensive Use of
Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair
|
Dealing
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6. Proposed holdings harmonizing Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren
Young Living suggests this Court can harmonize in this case the holdings of these
three cases, to wit:
a. Like all contract terms, integration depends on the contracting parties' intent.
The law favors writings to most clearly express the contracting parties' intent that the
writing embodies their whole agreement. Thus, if a written agreement contains a clear
integration clause, no extrinsic evidence is to be considered nor is it admissible on the
issue of integration, or to add to or vary terms of the written agreement. See Tangren,
and Tables 2 and 3 on pages 31 and 32, infra.
b. In the absence of a clear integration clause, the trial court considers all relevant
evidence to determine whether an agreement is integrated. If it is not integrated, the trial
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the terms of the parties' agreement.
See Tangren and Hall, and Table 2 on page 31, infra.
c. Even where there is a clear integration clause or the trial court finds based on
all relevant evidence that an agreement is integrated, extrinsic evidence is nevertheless
admissible to show the contract is void because it is a joke, sham, forgery, or is lacking in
consideration, or to show the contract is voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or
illegality. See Tangren and Brown, and Tables 2 and 3 on pages 31 and 32, infra.
d. Whereas extrinsic evidence may be admitted under the parol evidence rule only
to explain or clarify ambiguous terms of an integrated agreement, and extrinsic evidence
may also be admitted under a claim of the breach of the iimplied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing only to show one party prevented another party's performance or that
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party's receipt of the benefits the contract, in neither case may extrinsic evidence ever be
admitted to add to or vary terms of an unambiguous, integrated written agreement. See
Oakwood, Brown, and Tangren, and Table 3 on page 32, infra.

inn
urn
Hill
Hill
mil

urn
urn
urn
urn
Hill
Hill
Hill
mil
mil

urn
mil

urn
mil

urn
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Table 2: Integration
Clear Integration Clause v. Relevant Extrinsic Evidence
General Rule:
Where an agreement contains a clear integration clause,
extrinsic evidence may not be admitted on the issue of integration

If "Clear
Integration
Clause":
Integrated
No Extrinsic
Evidence

Relevant Extrinsic Evidence
Is Admissible
on the Issue of Integration
ONLY IF the Agreement Does
A/OrContain
a "Clear Integration Clause"

Exceptions:
Even where there is a "Clear Integration Clause" OR an agreement is otherwise found to be integrated,
extrinsic evidence may be used to show a contract is VOID (as a joke, sham, fraud, or forgery, or
for lack of consideration) OR VOIDABLE(for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality)
Sources: Tangren, U 17 at 332 (circle & rectangle); Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026-27 (circle)
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Table 3: Integration
Parol Evidence Rule and the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing
General Rule:
Where parties have an integrated agreement,
extrinsic evidence may not be used to add to or vary its terms

"Clear Integration
Clause" OR Otherwise
Integrated:
No Extrinsic Evidence is
Admissible to Add to or
Vary Contract Terms
Parol Evidence Rule:
Extrinsic Evidence is
Admissible ONLY to
Clarify
AMBIGUOUS TERMS

Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing:
Course of Dealing Evidence is Admissible
ONLY to Show
PREVENTED PERFORMANCE
OF CONTRACT TERMS

Exceptions:
Even where there is a "Clear Integration Clause" OR an agreement is otherwise found to be integrated,
extrinsic evidence may be used to show a contract is VOID (as a joke, sham, fraud, or forgery, or
for lack of consideration) OR VOIDABLE {tor fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality)
Sources: Oakwood, H 45 at 1226 (circle & main rectangle); Brown, 973 P.2d at 954 (circle & main
rectangle); Tangren,ffll11 & 15 at 330, 331 (both rectangles)
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e. Evidence admitted under the parol evidence rule topically, although not always,
involves the contracting parties' words or representations, while course of dealing and
conduct evidence admitted on the issue of a breach of the injiplied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing typically, although not always, involves the contracting parties' actions.
The contracting parties words and actions (i.e., representations outside the written
contract, course of dealing, and conduct) all fall under the definition of "extrinsic
evidence." Where parties have an integrated agreement, no extrinsic evidence may be
used to add to or alter its terms. Oakwood, Brown and Tangren, and Table 3 on page 32,
supra.
In harmonizing its prior holdings, this Court could dlso explicitly adopt the wellreasoned holding in United States Construction Corporation v. Harbor Bay Estates, Ltd.,
876 N.E.2d 637, f 42 at 643 (Ohio 2007) (copy at Addendum 5), to wit: "The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to make an end run around
the parol evidence rule." Id., quoting McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., 8th Dist. No.
79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL 31875200,124 (Emphadis added).
7. Conclusion
Based on the clear integration clause in the parties' Agreement, the court of
appeals correctly concluded under both the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and the parol evidence rule that Marin's affidavit was not admissible to add a
term to the parties' Agreement. Since the court of appeals!' conclusion was correct, this
Court should affirm and award Young Living its fees and costs.
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B.

MARIN FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
FOR APPEAL
This Court recently instructed:
[t]o preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a timely
and specific objection" before the trial court. We will not address an issue
if it is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for
seeking review.

K U.F. v. W.P. W.

P.3d

, 2009, WL 304711 (Utah 2009) (quoting State v. Low,

192 P.3d 867 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (copy at Addendum 1).
In this case, Marin did not raise a timely objection to Young Living's Proposed
Judgment or to Young Living's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), "[objections to the
proposed order

shall be filed within five days after service." Here, Young Living filed

and served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees on 27 May
2008. (R. 505, 492). Following this Marin was allowed five (5) days, plus three (3) days
for service by mail (Rule 6(e)), by which to file any objection to the Proposed Final
Judgment including the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, making any objection
due on 6 June 2008. Marin did not file his objection with the trial court until 11 June
2008. (R. 499).
Thus, Marin did not timely object to Young Living's Proposed Final Judgment
and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. By failing to do so, Marin failed to preserve
the issue of the reasonableness of Young Living's attorney's fees for appeal.

13 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 defines "Judgment" as used in the rules as a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies.
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In any event, Young Living agrees that it is not entitled to recover attorney fees
related to its tort and other non-contract claims, and in connection with issues on which it
did not prevail. Thus, if Young Living prevails in this appeal, it will submit a revised
affidavit of attorney fees to the trial court excluding $6,7514.50 for work in connection
with the additional claims in its Complaint and issues on which it did not prevail below.
If Young Living does not prevail on this appeal, the attorney fees issue will be moot since
the case will be remanded for trial, and since Marin did not jappeal the trial court's denial
of his "counter-motion" for summary judgment.
In response to some of Marin's additional arguments related to fees:
1. "No findings of fact as to attorney fees." The tifial court made no findings of
fact as to the attorney fees award because Marin's objection was untimely and the award
was therefore uncontested.
2. "Simple breach of contract case." Because fylarin evaded service, Young
Living expended additional fees and costs. It ultimately obtained an order for service by
publication (R. 36-48).
Because of the issues raised by Marin in his affidavit and his "countermotion" for
summary judgment (the denial of which Marin has not appqaled), and without the benefit
of the Tangren case which was decided later, Young Living sought for and obtained
Marin's approval of extensions to respond which it used to dlo:
•

detailed interviews of those who might have made thp central representation Marin
claimed in his affidavit (Marin's affidavit failed to provide a time or place of the
representation, or the identity of the person making the purported representation);
35

•

a review of email communications between the parties (R. 171-287, 465-487);

•

a review of a companion agreement of Marin's upline supervisor related to the
production of "marketing tools" (R. 180-232); and

•

research regarding Marin's experience in developing "marketing tools" (R. 184203, 238-252, 256-272).

Vvz-Tangren, Young Living was prudent in fulfilling its obligation under Hall to provide
"all relevant" evidence to the trial court on the issue of integration.

It is thus

disingenuous of Marin to claim Young Living's inefficiency when his assertions were the
cause of the additional work occasioned by his affidavit and "countermotion" for
summary judgment, and when he granted the extensions requested.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals correctly ruled that Marin's affidavit could not be admitted to
add an oral term to the parties' expressly integrated written agreement.
Marin did not preserve the attorney's fees and costs issues for appeal.
This Court should affirm the court of appeals and award Young Living its costs
and fees, including on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this /(&Hi day of April, 2010.
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC

}

Ot^
Barnard N. Madsen
Attorneys for Respondent Young Living
Essential Oils, LC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ITtfc

I certify that on the ' I day of April, 2010, I caused twO true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be sent by first-class mail, prepaid, to the following:
Scott B. Mitchell
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
:Attorney for Petitioner Carlos Marin

^lArtAjj A. i k i A
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Affirmed.
Supreme Court of Utah.
H.U.F. and G.F., Petitioners and Appellees,
v.
W.P.W., Respondent and Appellant.
No. 20070610.
Feb. 10,2009.
Background: Putative father filed motion to intervene in adoption proceeding. Following a hearing,
the Fourth District, Provo Department, Lynn W.
Davis, J., granted adoptive parent's motions to dismiss and strike putative father's motion to intervene, and putative father appealed. The Court of
Appeals certified the case for immediate transfer.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate
C.J., held that:
(1) putative father's arguments on appeal were not
moot;
(2) putative father did not comply with Arizona requirements to preserve his parental rights, as required in order to qualify for exception to Utah statute that denied putative fathers who did not register
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest
adoptions;
(3) evidence was sufficient to establish that putative
father had reason to believe that mother had moved
to Utah and thus was required to register with Office of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his parental rights and intervene in the adoption proceeding;
(4) Arizona paternity order was entitled to full faith
and credit; but
(5) error of trial court in concluding that Arizona
order was not entitled to full faith and credit was
harmless, as such order had no bearing on putative
father's right to challenge adoption;
(6) trial court could make findings of fact without
providing putative father with an evidentiary hearing; and
(7) putative father's appeal was not frivolous.

West Headnotes
[11 Appeal and Error 30 €^>842(1)
30 Appeal and E^ror
30XVI Review
30XV1(4) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k83£j Questions Considered
30kB42 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court review a district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness.
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>1008.1(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(|l) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI|(I)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30k 1008.1 In General
30k 1008.1 (5) k. Clearly Erroneous Findings. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews a district court's findings of
fact under a clearly erroneous standard.
(3 j Appeal andlError 30 € ^ 8 4 2 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error

30XV1 ReviJw
30XVT(fO Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30M842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are o|f Law or of Fact
30k842(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Supreme Court reviews a district court's ruling regarding a statutes constitutionality for correctness.
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f4] Appeal and Error 30 €^>843(1)
30 Appeal and Error
3OX.VI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k843 Matters Not Necessary to Decision on Review
30k843(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
An argument is moot on appeal if the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.
[5] Adoption 17 € ^ 1 5
17 Adoption
17k.9 Judicial Proceedings
17k!5 k. Review. Most Cited Cases
Putative father's arguments on appeal of trial court
orders regarding his attempt to intervene in adoption proceeding were not moot on the ground that
he only addressed trial court's order granting adoptive parents' motion to dismiss putative father's motion to intervene and did not address trial court's order granting adoptive parent's motion to strike motion to intervene based on putative father's false assertions, where putative father in his opening brief
challenged trial court's finding that putative father
had knowledge that birth mother was in Utah, and,
though putative father did not explicitly state he
was challenging the motion to strike, the challenge
was substantially briefed.
[6J Adoption 17 €=^>15
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases
Putative father did not preserve for appeal a due
process challenge and equal protection challenge, in
his appeal of trial court order dismissing and striking his motion to intervene in adoption proceeding,
where putative father's motion to intervene in the
trial court did not raise a due process or equal protection challenge, and trial court's rulings did not
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consider a due process or equal protection challenge. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
14; Rules
App.Prpc, Rule 24(a).
[7] Appeal and Error 30 0 ^ 1 6 9
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30k 169 k. Necessity of Presentation in
General. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court will not address an issue if it is not
preserved or if the appellant has not established
other grounds for seeking review. Rules App.Proc,
Rule 24(a).
[8] Adoption 17 €^7.2(3)
17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7.2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent
in General
17k7.2(3) k. Illegitimate Children. Most
Cited Cases
Putative father, who resided in Arizona where
mother also resided and failed to register with Utah
Office of Vital Statistics, failed to comply with the
most stringent and complete Arizona statutory requirements to preserve his parental rights, as required in order to qualify for exception to Utah statute that denied putative fathers who did not register
with Office of Vital Statistics the right to contest
adoptions; Arizona statute required a putative father
to initiate a paternity action within 30 days of receiving notice that a birth mother intended to give a
child up for adoption, birth mother served putative
father with notice stating that if he wished to assert
his parental rights he "must" start a paternity action
within 30 days, notice putative father received was
not ambiguous, and putative father did not start his
paternity action in Arizona within 30 days of receipt of the notice. U.C.A.I953, 78-30-4.14
(Repealed); A.R.S. §8-106(G).
[91 Statutes 361 €>^>188
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361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VT(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
36lkl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts look first to the
statute's plain language to determine its meaning.
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361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 lkl 80 Intention of Legislature
361M81 In General
361kl81(2)k. Effect and Consequences. Most) Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €^=>206

(101 Statutes 361 €>^>205
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36Ik204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k205 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Statutes 361 €=^208
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36lk204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
36lk208 k. Context and Related
Clauses. Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €=^223.2(.5)

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A)]General Rules of Construction
361k2D4 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
|361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts seek an interpretation that reinders all parts of a statute relevant
and meaningful and interpretations are to be
avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absutd.
[12] Appeal antf Error 30 €^1008.1(5)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XV|(J)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30k 1008.1 In General
30k 1008 J (5) k. Clearly Erroneous Findings.IMost Cited Cases
Supreme Court jwill overturn a district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.

361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 k223 Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
361k223.2 Statutes Relating to the
Same Subject Matter in General
361k223.2(.5) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
When interpreting a statute, courts read the plain
language of a statute as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same
and related chapters.

17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7.8 Evidence
17k7i(3) Weight and Sufficiency
17k7.8(4) k. Necessity of Consent in
General. Most Cited Cases

Jill Statutes 361 €>^>181(2)

Adoption 17 € ^ 1 1

[131 Adoption \1 €^>7.8(4)
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17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 11 k. Petition and Parties. Most Cited
Cases
Evidence was sufficient to establish, at hearing on
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's motion to intervene in Utah adoption
proceeding, that putative father, who resided in Arizona where birth mother also resided, had reason to
know that mother moved to Utah, and thus that putative father was required to register with Utah Office of Vital Statistics in order to preserve his parental rights and intervene in the adoption proceeding; though mother sent e-mail to putative father
one week after she obtained protective order against
him in Arizona denying that she moved to Utah,
father in open court at hearing on mother's request
for protective order testified that she told him she
moved
to
Utah.
U.C.A.1953,
78-30-4.14
(Repealed).
[14] Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H € ^ 6 4
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
76Hk64 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H € ^ 6 8
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
76Hk68 k. Operation and Effect. Most
Cited Cases
Arizona paternity order, finding that putative father
was the biological father, complied with Arizona
requirements for a judgment, for purposes of determining whether the order was entitled to full
faith and credit when putative father sought to intervene in Utah adoption proceeding; though order
was not executed by a judge and copy provided to
Utah court was not certified, Arizona law only required that the judgment be in writing and signed
by a judge or a court commissioner duly authorized
to do so, and paternity order was in writing and
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signed by a deputy clerk. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, §
1; 16 A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 58(a).
f 151 Judgment 228 €^=>815
228 Judgment
228XV1I Foreign Judgments
228k814 Judgments of State Courts
228k8l5 k. Adjudications Operative in
Other States. Most Cited Cases
As to matters of jurisdiction, a judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit if the same issue as to jurisdiction was raised in the foreign court and adjudicated therein. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1.
[161 Children Out-Of-Wedlock 76H ©^>68
76H Children Out-Of-Wedlock
76HV Paternity Proceedings
76Hk63 Judgment or Order
7611k68 k. Operation and Effect. Most
Cited Cases
Arizona order of paternity regarding putative father
was entitled to full faith and credit, when putative
father sought to intervene in Utah adoption proceeding, though the Arizona court determined that
it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody as the
child did not reside in Arizona and had not resided
in Arizona in the previous six months, as a lack of
jurisdiction over custody did not equate to a lack of
jurisdiction over a paternity determination, and the
Arizona court took testimony, considered its jurisdiction regarding paternity and determined that the
putative father was the biological father. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 4, § 1; A.R.S. §§ 8-106(G),
25-I002(3)(a), 25-1031.
[17] Adoption 17 € = ^ 1 5
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 15 k. Review. Most Cited Cases
Error of Utah court, when it granted adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's
motion to intervene in adoption proceeding, in concluding that Arizona paternity order was not en-
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titled to full faith and credit, was harmless error, as
the Arizona paternity order had not bearing on putative father's right to contest the adoption; under
Arizona the law the right to contest paternity was a
separate and distinct right from the right to contest
an adoption, and the Arizona court concluded that it
did not have jurisdiction to determine custody.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; A.R.S. § 8-106(G).
[181 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1026
30 Appeal and Error
30XVT Review
30XV1(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)1 In General
30kl025 Prejudice to Rights of Party
as Ground of Review
30k 1026 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that
it affected the outcome of the proceedings.
(191 Adoption 17 €^>7.2(3)
17 Adoption
17k7 Consent of Parties
17k7.2 Natural Parents, Necessity of Consent
in General
17k7.2(3) k. Illegitimate Children. Most
Cited Cases
Under Arizona law, the right to contest paternity is
distinct from the right to contest an adoption, as a
putative father may establish paternity at any time,
but he may only establish the right to contest an adoption if: (1) he initiates a paternity action within
30 days of receiving notice of a planned adoption,
and (2) that action results in a paternity order.
A.R.S. § 8 - 106(G).
[20] Adoption 17 C=>11
17 Adoption
17k9 Judicial Proceedings
17k 11 k. Petition and Parties. Most Cited
Cases
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Trial court could make findings of fact, in hearing
on adoptive parents' motion to dismiss and strike
putative father's motion to intervene in adoption
proceeding, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
where the trial cpurt provided the parties the opportunity to present evidence, counsel for putative
father requested! that the matter be argued only on
the law and objected to an evidentiary argument,
the parties did not present any evidence, and the trial court relied 6n facts in the record to make its
findings. Rules p v . P r o c , Rule 43(b).
[211 Costs 102 €^>260(5)
102 Costs
102X On Appeal or Error
102k259 Damages and Penalties for Frivolous Appeal and belay
102k2f>0 Right and Grounds
102k260(5) k. Nature and Form of
Judgment, Actic-n, or Proceedings for Review. Most
Cited Cases
Putative father's! appeal of trial court order granting
adoptive parents' motions to dismiss and strike putative father's njotion to intervene in adoption proceeding was no|t frivolous, and thus adoptive parents were not entitled to their attorney fees on appeal; though putative father did not prevail, Supreme Court foi^nd that putative father's appeal was
not moot as argued by adoptive parents, though putative father failed to preserve two issues he raised
on appeal he raised other issues that were properly
before the Supreme Court, putative father's argument that had np reason to know that mother was in
Utah was not made in bad faith, and putative father's challenge t<^ the lack of an evidentiary hearing
was made in |ood faith. Rules App.Proc, Rule
33(b).
Hutch U. Fale, Provo, Nathan E. Burdsal, Salt Lake
City, for petitioners.
H. Mifflin Williams, III, Salt Lake City, Claudia
McGee Henry, f^os Angeles, CA, for respondent.
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION
*1 1| 1 In this case, W.P.W. ("Putative Father")
challenges the adoption of Baby Girl Stine
("B.G.S."), arguing that the district court erred in
ordering the adoption of B.G.S. without his consent. H.U.F. and G.F. ("Adoptive Parents") defend
the district court's order by arguing that the Putative
Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary
because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements that give a putative father the right to
contest an adoption.
K 2 Specifically, the parties raise the following issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot because he appealed only one of two dispositive orders;
(2) Whether Utah's statutory scheme for adoptions
violated the Putative Father's due process and
equal protection rights, and whether these constitutional challenges were preserved;
(3) Whether the Putative Father complied with Utah
Code section 78-30-4.14, which establishes the
requirements a putative father must meet before
he may contest an adoption;
(4) Whether the district court should have granted
full faith and credit to Arizona's Paternity Order;
(5) Whether the district court should have held an
evidentiary hearing; and
(6) Whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting the award of attorney fees to the
Adoptive Parents.
U 3 We affirm the district court's decision.
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BACKGROUND
K 4 On or about September 22, 2005, while the
Birth Mother was pregnant with B.G.S., she served
two men with notice that she intended to place her
baby for adoption through LDS Family Services in
Mesa, Arizona. The notice stated that if its recipient
wished to assert parental rights to the baby, he was
required to initiate a paternity action pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 within thirty
days of receipt of the notice. The notice also included the full text of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106. In addition, the Birth Mother published
public notices in Arizona newspapers four times
over a period of four weeks between September and
October 2005. The public notices were addressed
to, "William Patrick Wilks or Nathaniel Davis or
John Doe."
H 5 In response, the Putative Father filed a Notice
of Claim of Paternity with the Arizona Office of
Vital Records on September 29, 2005. This filing
placed the Putative Father's name on the Putative
Father Registry in Arizona. As a registrant, the Putative Father had the right to be identified by the vital statistics office if the office were to receive a
search letter regarding the child whom the Putative
Father claimed he fathered. Thereafter, the entity
assisting in the placement of the child for adoption
would be responsible for notifying the Putative
Father of any legal proceedings regarding the child.
The vital statistics office indicated in a letter to the
Putative Father that he must follow the provisions
of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106 to establish paternity.
U 6 In February 2006, the Birth Mother filed a petition with an Arizona justice court seeking a protective order against the Putative Father. A hearing was
held on the matter on February 7. At the hearing,
counsel representing the Birth Mother stated that
the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get away from
[the Putative Father], and to be up there, and that's
where she is, and there's no need for [the Putative
Father] to be allowed to harass her.'The Putative
Father responded, "Yes, um [the Birth Mother] told
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me when she moved to Utah."
*2 % 7 The Putative Father never registered with the
Utah Office of Vital Statistics as a putative father.
\ 8 On February 15, 2006, one hundred and fortyfive days after being served with notice that the
Birth Mother intended to place her baby for adoption, the Putative Father filed a petition for paternity with the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa
County. Because the Putative Father failed to properly serve the Birth Mother, the petition was not
granted.
11 9 B.G.S. was born in Utah on March 4, 2006.
Two days later, in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah, the Birth Mother willingly relinquished all
of her parental rights and responsibilities to the Adoptive Parents. The Birth Mother also stated to the
district court that she was not, nor had she ever
been, married to the natural father of B.G.S. and
that the identity of the father was unknown. Further, she stated that the natural father had not initiated a paternity action in Utah, despite having actual notice that the Birth Mother had moved to Utah
PNJ1

and planned to give birth to the baby in Utah.
f 10 On March 15, 2006, the Adoptive Parents filed
a petition for temporary custody and guardianship
and a verified petition for adoption, wherein they
indicated that "[p]ursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-30-4.14, the consent of the natural mother is the
only consent required in order for the Court to grant
the instant petition."They further stated that the
presumed natural father had actual notice and
knowledge that the Birth Mother resided in Utah
and that she intended to give birth in Utah, They
also stated that the presumed natural father had not
registered with the Office of Vital Statistics in the
Utah Department of Health, nor had he begun a paternity proceeding in the State of Utah. On March
17, 2006, the district court granted the Adoptive
Parents "full and complete custody and guardianship of [B.G.S.] until such time when the Court issues a final order concerning Petitioner's Petition
for Adoption."
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f 11 On April 1 2006, the Putative Father again
petitioned the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa
County for a declaration of paternity. Again, he
failed to properly serve the Birth Mother.
H 12 On July 25,12006, in the Superior Court of Arizona, the Putative Father filed a Voluntary Petition
for Order of Patbrnity signed by the Birth Mother.
In an order dated August 2, 2006, the Arizona court
"note[d]" that this voluntary petition "resolvfed] the
paternity issue."! The court also noted that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine custody or child support
and ordered that the matter be transferred to Utah
for further proceedings.
H 13 On July 27|, 2006, the Putative Father requested that the Utah court open the sealed Utah file regarding the adopjtion proceedings. Then, in the Utah
court on September 1, 2006, the Putative Father
filed an intervener's response to the petition for adoption. In an affidavit filed with the court, the Putative Father stated that the Birth Mother told him
"verbally and bf e-mail ... that she would not give
affiant's baby up for adoption and that she would
always keep in iouch with affiant."Further, the Putative Father stalted in the affidavit that he "had no
knowledge whatsoever, and received no notice
whatsoever that [the Birth Mother] resided in Utah
and intended to give birth to [B.G.S.] in Utah."
*3 H 14 On August 31, 2006, and again on November 27, 2006, the Birth Mother submitted an affidavit stating to the Utah court that she never gave
the Putative Fa ther notice that she had moved to
Utah or planned to give birth in Utah. With the
second affidavit, the Birth Mother included an email that she ha< l sent to the Putative Father on February 14, 2006, one week following the protective
order hearing, The e-mail stated, "[my parents]
made me tell al( my friends and some family that I
moved to Utah when I really didn't, nor do I have
any intentions;of moving to Utah."
1) 15 On December 12, 2006, the Adoptive Parents
moved to dism iss the Putative Father's objection to
the adoption ana motion to intervene. On February
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2, 2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter. Counsel for the Putative Father requested that
the matter be argued only on the law and objected
to an evidentiary argument. The court declined to
determine the type of hearing and, instead, left the
matter up to counsel. At the hearing, the parties did
not present any evidence. The Putative Father was
present, but his counsel did not call him to testify.
U 16 On April 17, 2007, the district court issued one
ruling that granted the Motion to Strike and the Motion to Dismiss. In the ruling, the district court
barred the affidavits submitted by the Birth Mother,
finding that they contradicted "the law of the case"
and were obtained unethically. Next, the court declined to give full faith and credit to the Arizona
court's statement regarding the Putative Father's paternity, finding that the Arizona court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order of paternity; the court also
highlighted additional problems with the order itself. Finally, the court ruled that the Putative Father
failed to comply with the Utah statutory requirements for out-of-state putative fathers. Accordingly, the court ruled that the Putative Father
"lack[ed] standing to challenge this adoption," and
"Petitioners' Motion to Strike the Objection and to
Dismiss the Motion to Intervene is hereby granted."
K 17 The Putative Father appealed, and the court of
appeals heard oral argument in the case. After oral
argument, but before any decision issued in this
case, the court of appeals issued a split decision in
In re K C.J. " Concerned that its decision in this
case might conflict with its decision in KC.J., the
court of appeals certified this case for immediate
transfer to us, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(a). In K.C.J., the court of appeals
held that where the district court becomes aware of
a putative father's interest and desire to participate
in the adoption proceeding, the court should allow
the father to participate, at least to the extent of litigating th£ legitimacy of his right to contest the adoption. ' " We need not reach the issue presented
in K.C.J., however, because the Adoptive Parents
have not challenged the Putative Father's right to
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adjudicate whether he may contest the adoption of
B.G.S. Rather, the Adoptive Parents make substantive arguments regarding whether the Putative Father has the right to contest the adoption.
*4 T| 18 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[l][2][3fli 19 The Putative Father challenges the
district court's interpretation of Utah and Arizona
statutes, the district court's finding that the Putative
Father failed to comply with Utah and Arizona statutes, and the constitutionality of Utah's statutory requirements for putative fathers to establish parental
rights. We review a district court's interpretation of
a statute for correctness. ' We review a district
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard. * * And we review a district court's ruling
regarding a statute's constitutionality for correct-

ANALYSIS
f 20 As threshold issues, we first address (1)
whether the Putative Father's appeal is moot, and
(2) whether the Putative Father preserved a due
process and an equal protection challenge. Holding
that the appeal is not moot but that the Putative
Father failed to preserve a due process and an equal
protection challenge, we then address (3) whether
the Putative Father complied with Utah Code section 78-30-4.15 (2005),
and (4) whether the
district court should have given full faith and credit
to the Arizona court's paternity order. Finally, we
turn to (5) whether the district court should have
held an evidentiary hearing, and (6) whether the Putative Father's appeal is frivolous, warranting attorney fees.
I. THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S CLAIMS ARE
NOT MOOT BECAUSE HE CHALLENGED THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
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ONLY RULING
[4jffl 21 An argument is moot "[i]f the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
1V
f „FN8
litigants.
[5]K 22 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative Father's arguments on appeal are moot because
they only address one of two dispositive orders by
the district court. Particularly, the Adoptive Parents
argue that the Putative Father only contests the district court's order granting the Motion to Dismiss
Alleged Biological Father's Objection and Motion
to Intervene ("Motion to Dismiss"), without contesting the district court's order granting the Motion
to Strike the Objection and Motion to Intervene
("Motion to Strike"). The Adoptive Parents state
that these motions served different purposes. The
Motion to Dismiss asserted that the Putative Father
failed to establish "that he is entitled to any interest
or right to intervene."The Motion to Strike asserted
that the Putative Father's attempt to intervene was
FN9
based upon a false assertion of a material fact
and should therefore be stricken.
% 23 The Putative Father argues in his reply brief
that in his opening brief he did challenge the court's
order granting the Motion to Strike. In his opening
brief, the Putative Father challenged the district
court's finding that the Putative Father had knowledge that the Birth Mother was in Utah. Although
this challenge to the Motion to Strike is not explicit-nowhere does the Putative Father state that he is
challenging the Motion to Strike-the challenge is
nonetheless substantively briefed. Accordingly, we
hold that the Putative Father challenged the Motion
to Strike; therefore, the Putative Father's arguments
on appeal are not moot.

II. THE PUTATIVE FATHER FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES
*5 [6]1f 24 The Adoptive Parents contend that the
Putative Father failed to preserve a due process

challenge and an equal protection challenge in the
district court. They are correct.
[7]^| 25 The pr0servation requirement is found in
rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, that for
each issue raised on appeal, an appellant's brief
must include a 'citation to the record showing that
the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds] for seekingjreview
of an issue not
n
1(L
preserved in the trial court."
To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised "a

5fi

timely.^ and specific objection" before the trial
We will not address an issue if it is not
court,
preserved or if the appellant has not established
other grounds fqr seeking review FN 12
U 26 Rather than advancing grounds upon which we
may review an unpreserved issue, the Putative
Father argues that he preserved in the trial court all
of the issues that he raises on appeal. The Putative
Father's brief rnakes the following statement regarding preservation: "The issues raised in this
brief were preserved by appellant's documents filed
in the district CQurt, including his Petition and Motion to Intervene, and by the issues discussed by the
district court in| its Ruling on Motion to Intervene
and Motion to Dismiss, dated April 17,
2007."While thk brief does not match record citaf.
FN 13
tions with specific issues raised,
it does at
least reference documents wherein the issues
should be found.
^ 27 Reviewing! trie documents cited by the Putative
Father, we conclude that the Putative Father did not
preserve a due process challenge or an equal protection challenge. The Natural Father's Objection
and Motion to (intervene as Respondent raises the
following arguments: (1) the Putative Father complied with Utahis statute that sets guidelines for outof-state putativfe fathers to establish their parental
rights; and (2) | he complied with the Arizona requirements for putative fathers to establish their
parental rights. In its ruling, the district court addressed the following issues: (1) whether the Birth
Mother's affidavits should be barred, (2) whether
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full faith and credit should be given to Arizona's
statement of paternity, and (3) whether the Putative
Father complied with the Utah requirements for
out-of-state putative fathers to establish paternity
rights. It is clear from our review that neither the
Putative Father's challenges nor the district court's
rulings consider a due process or equal protection
challenge. Accordingly, we will not address these
issues on appeal.
III. THE PUTATIVE FATHER DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH
CODE SECTION 78-30-4.14
H 28 Before a putative father may establish the right
to contest an adoption in Utah, he must meet the requirements outlined in Utah Code section
78-30-4.14 (Supp.2005). One such requirement is
that the putative father register with the Utah Office
of Vital Statistics. ' The statute includes an exception to this requirement, however, if the following circumstances are satisfied: (1) the putative
father "resides and has resided in another state
where the unmarried mother was also located or
resided;" (2) "the mother left that state without notifying or informing the unmarried biological father
that she could be located in the state of Utah;" (3)
the putative father "through every reasonable
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not
know or have reason to know that the mother is
residing in the state of Utah;" and (4) the putative
father "has complied with the most stringent and
complete requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to
protect and preserve his parental interest and right
FN I ^
in the child in cases of adoption."
*6 K 29 The Putative Father admits that he did not
comply with the statute's general requirements, but
he contends that he qualified for the exception. The
district court ruled that the Putative Father did not
qualify for the exception because he (1) did not
comply " 'with the most stringent and complete' "
Arizona requirements " 'in order to protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in
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cases of adoption,' " and (2) he knew or had reason
to know that the Birth Mother could be located in
Utah. We address both of the district court's findings in turn.
A. The Putative Father Failed to Comply with the
Most Stringent and Complete Arizona Requirements
[8]U 30 The district court reasoned that the Putative
Father did not comply with the most stringent and
complete Arizona requirements established in Arizona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) because he
did not initiate a paternity action within thirty days
of receiving notice that the Birth^Mother intended
to give B.G.S. up for adoption. " An/ona Revised Statute section 8-106(G) provides, in relevant
part, that each potential father shall be served notice of the planned adoption, and the notice shall inform the potential father that his "failure to file a
paternity action pursuant to title 25, chapter 6, article 1," x
"within thirty days of completion of
service"
of the notice prescribed by this section, "bars the potential father from bringing or
maintaining any action to assert any interest in the
child." F N f 5
U 31 The Putative Father argues that this language
does not actually impose any time limits on putative fathers because the language is couched in
terms of a requirement that the birth mother include
the language in her notice to the putative father. He
further contends that, for policy reasons, the statute
cannot possibly bar a putative father from establishing paternity at any time, otherwise if the birth
mother decided not to place the baby for adoption,
the putative father would be "off the hook for child
support.'Tinally, he argues that the notice he received was ambiguous and therefore did not actually put him on notice of a mandatory thirty-day
limit to initiate a paternity action.
[9]| 10If 11fil32 The Putative Father's interpretation
of the statute is unpersuasive because it produces an
absurd result and contradicts the plain language of
the statute. When we interpret a statute, " 'we look
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its
meaning.' " '
We read the plain language of a
statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other provisions in the same statute
and with other statutes under the same and related
FN? 1
chapters. * " We seek an interpretation that
renders all parts of a statute "relevant and meaningful, and interpretations are to be avoided which
render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." r * Z ~
^ 33 Contrary to the Putative Father's contention, it
would be absurd for the Arizona legislature to require a birth mother to give a putative father notice
that he had only thirty days to initiate a paternity
action but then give the putative father unlimited
time to initiate the action. Such a result would
render meaningless the provision in the required
notice section. Further, the language of section
8-106 is plain and unambiguously requires a putative father to initiate a paternity action within thirty
days of receiving notice of a planned adoption; otherwise, he has no right to contest the adoption. This
interpretation is not refuted by policy, as the Putative Father contends. Limiting the time in which a
putative father may establish the right to contest an
adoption does not limit the putative father's financial obligations with respect to that child if the birth
mother chooses not to place the child for adoption.
Section 8-106 regards only the right to contest an
adoption, not any other rights or obligations that a
putative father may have regarding his child.
*7 T] 34 The Putative Father's final argument, that
the notice he received was ambiguous, is incorrect
and irrelevant. He argues that two paragraphs in the
notice "contradict each other about whether the
[Putative Father] must or may initiate a paternity
proceeding in order to establish interest in the
child."We hold that the text of the notice was unambiguous. In one place the notice did read that the
Putative Father "may" initiate a paternity action,
and, in another place, it stated that the Putative
Father "must" initiate the action within thirty days
in order to retain a right to contest the adoption.

This language te not ambiguous; it simply clarifies
that it is not necessary for the Putative Father to initiate a paternity action if he does not desire to do
so. However, ift he does desire to, then he must do
so within thirty days. Even if the notice were ambiguous, the notice included the text of the statute,
which indicated that the father must initiate a paternity action within thirty days of receipt of the notice in order to establish the right to contest the adoption. Further, when the Putative Father registered
with the Arizona vital statistics office, he again received the text lof the statute. Therefore, the Putative Father had sufficient notice of the requirement
to initiate a patdrnity action within thirty days of receipt of the notibe of a planned adoption.
\ 35 We uphold the district court's finding that the
Putative Fathetf failed to comply with the most
stringent and complete Arizona requirements. The
Putative Father! failed to initiate a paternity action
within thirty da^ys of receiving notice of a planned
adoption, as required by section 8-106.

B. The Putative Father Knew or Had Reason to
Know Tha\t the Birth Mother was in Utah
[ 12JU 36 The district court reasoned that the Putative Father knew or had reason to know that the
Birth Mother was in Utah because, at a protective
order hearing that was held less than thirty days before B.G.S. wa$ born, the Birth Mother's attorney
stated that the Birth Mother "went to Utah to get
away from [the! Putative Father], and be up there,
and that's wheife she is." The Putative Father responded, "Yes^ um [the Birth Mother] told me
when she mov0d to Utah."We will overturn a district court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly
erroneous."
[13]K 37 The Ptitative Father argues that he did not
know that the Birth Mother was in Utah because he
received an e-mail from the Birth Mother one week
following the protective order hearing stating that
she had not mqved to Utah. To discredit the attorney's statement! made at the protective order hear-
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ing, the Putative Father argues, "no reasonable unmarried father, seeking to vindicate his paternity
rights, would base his actions on the representations
of the attorney for a woman who has obtained an
order of protection against him."He also argues that
he did not know where the Birth Mother was living
because the protective order prevented him from
contacting her.
*8 K 38 Again, the Putative Father's arguments are
unpersuasive. Utah Code section 78-30-4.14 requires only that a putative father "have reason to
know" that a birth mother was residing in Utah, not
that he have actual knowledge. In open court, the
Putative Father testified that the Birth Mother told
him that she had moved to Utah. This statement is
sufficient for the district court to find that the Putative Father had reason to know that the Birth Mother
was in Utah. Although the Birth Mother stated a
week later in an e-mail to the Putative Father that
she had not moved to Utah, the Putative Father still
had reason to believe she was in Utah because she
had previously told him that she was there, her attorney told him that she was there, and the Birth
Mother's statement that she had not "moved" to
Utah did not necessarily mean that she was not
staying in Utah until the baby was born and placed
for adoption. For these reasons, the district court's
finding that the Putative Father had reason to know
that the Birth Mother was in Utah is not clearly erroneous.

the Putative Father's unestablished right to contest
the adoption.

A. The District Court Committed Harmless Error
When It Failed to Give Full Faith and Credit to the
Arizona Paternity Order
H 40"Pursuant to the United States Constitution,
'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records andjudicial Proceedings of every other State.'" *"* Specifically, we
"give full faith and credit to a declaration of paternity or denial of paternity effective in another state if
the declaration or denial has been signed and is otherwise in compliance with the law of the other

state."™26
[14]U 41 The district court declined to give full
faith and credit to the Arizona paternity order because the district court found that "the Arizona
Court now recognizes that it lacked jurisdiction,"
and "[t]his Court, not the State of Arizona, has exclusive jurisdiction
regarding
custody
of
[B.G.S.]."FN27
[15]fl6]H 42 As to matters of jurisdiction, a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit "if the same
issue as to jurisdiction was raised in the foreign
FN28
court and adjudicated therein." :
In this case, the
Arizona court did take testimony and consider its
jurisdiction. The Arizona court stated as follows in
its order:

IV. THE ARIZONA PATERNITY ORDER DOES
NOT IMPACT THIS CASE BECAUSE IT WAS
UNTIMELY TO ESTABLISH THE PUTATIVE
FATHER'S RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ADOPTION

After discussion with the parties present, the
Court elicits testimony under oath on the record
in open court that the minor child ... does not
reside in the state of Arizona and has not resided
in the state of Arizona for the past six (6) months.

K 39 The Putative Father argues that "the Arizona
Order of Paternity prevents the adoption of B.G.S.
without the [Putative Father's] permission" and that
the district court erred in not giving full faith and
credit to the paternity order. We hold that the district court did err, but the error was harmless because the Arizona paternity order has no impact on

*9 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1031, this Court does
not have jurisdiction to determine custody at this
time.
(Emphasis added.)
\ 43 However, the Arizona court did not find that it
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lacked jurisdiction to issue a paternity order; rather
the court stated that the Voluntary Petition for Order of Paternity "resolv[es] the paternity issue."
The court then ordered the matter transferred to
Utah "for all further proceedings." A lack of jurisdiction as to a custody determination does not
equate to a lack of jurisdiction as to a paternity determination. A "child custody determination" is
"any judgment, decree or other order of a court, including a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order, for legal custody, physical custody
or visitation with respect to a child." A A determination that an individual is the biological father of a child is not a determination that the biological father has custody or visitation rights with respect to that child. Accordingly, the Arizona court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine
custody but not to determine paternity.
[17][18]Tf 44 Being aware that the Arizona court
had itself concluded that it had jurisdiction, the
Utah district court erred in addressing the question
of whether the Arizona court, in fact, had jurisdiction. However, the error was harmless. "
'[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.'
FNR0
" ' w In this case, the district court's error in declining to grant the Arizona paternity order full
faith and credit was harmless because the order has
no bearing on the Putative Father's right to contest
the adoption of B.G.S.
B. The Arizona Paternity Order Has No Impact on
the Putative Father's Right to Contest the Adoption
of B.G.S.
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of the planned adoption in order to establish the
FN3 I
right to contest an adoption. * If the putative
father fails to initiate a paternity action within the
time specified, then he is barred "from bringing or
maintaining, any action to assert any interest in the
child." L ~ "This language is found within the statute entitled, "Consent to adoption; who shall consent; waiver; cdnsent to the release of information;
i
FN 3 3
notification to potential fathers."
[ 19 Jlf 47 The putative Father argues that because
the Arizona court, having jurisdiction to do so, issued an order declaring him to be B.G.S.'s father,
he need not mee^t the thirty-day requirement. This is
not the case. This interpretation of Arizona law
would render the thirty-day requirement meaningless. Under Arizona law, the right to contest paternity is distinct from the right to contest an adoption.
A putative father may establish paternity at any
time, but he may only establish the right to contest
an adoption if (1) he initiates a paternity action
within thirty days of receiving notice of a planned
adoption and (^) that action results in a paternity
order.
*10 K 48 Accordingly, we can consistently give full
faith and credit) to the Arizona paternity order, but
nevertheless hold that the Putative Father did not
establish the fight to contest the adoption of
FN34
B.G.S. * In failing to give the paternity order
full faith and credit, the district court committed error. But that error was harmless because the paternity order alone is insufficient to establish the right
to contest the adoption.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO PfOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

K 45 We hold that a declaration of paternity from
Arizona does not necessarily establish the right to
contest an adoption in Arizona. Rather, the right to
contest an adoption is a more narrow right that must
be established through specified means.

[20JH 49 The Putative Father contends that the district court erred in finding facts without holding an
evidentiary heading.

\ 46 In Arizona, a putative father must initiate a paternity action within thirty days of receiving notice

H 50 Pursuant to rule 43(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure] "[w]hen a motion is based on facts
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not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties,
but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions."
K 51 In this case, the court provided the parties the
opportunity to present evidence. On February 2,
2007, the district court held a hearing on the matter.
Counsel for the Putative Father requested that the
matter be argued only on the law and objected to an
evidentiary argument. The court declined to determine what type of hearing would be held and left
the matter up to counsel. At the hearing, the parties
did not present any evidence. The Putative Father
was present, but his counsel did not call him to
testify. Subsequently, the court relied on facts in
the record to make its findings.
K 52 We hold that the district court did not err in
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court
provided the parties an opportunity to present evidence, but counsel for the Putative Father declined.
Further, the court relied only on facts in the record
to make its findings.

VI. THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S APPEAL IS NOT
FRIVOLOUS
TJ 53 The Adoptive Parents argue that the Putative
Father's "appeal is frivolous as it is not grounded."The Adoptive Parents base their argument on
the following claims: (1) the Putative Father's claim
is moot because he only challenged one of two dispositive orders; (2) the Putative Father makes arguments on appeal that he failed to preserve; (3) the
Putative Father challenges findings of fact without
fully marshaling the evidence that supports those
findings; (4) the Putative Father ignores the essential fact he admitted to the court at the protective
order hearing-that he knew the Birth Mother went
to Utah; and (5) the Putative Father challenges the
lack of an evidentiary hearing when it was counsel
for the Putative Father who declined an evidentiary
hearing.
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[21]^] 54 The Adoptive Parents' arguments fail to
establish that the Putative Father filed a frivolous
claim. A frivolous claim under rule 33(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure"is one that is
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law,
or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law."We address each
of the Adoptive Parents' arguments in turn.
*11 Tf 55 First, the Putative Father did challenge the
substance of both the Motion to Strike and the Motion to Dismiss, therefore his claim is not moot.
Second, although the Putative Father failed to preserve two of the issues that he raises on appeal, he
still raises other issues that are properly before us
for consideration. Third, the Adoptive Parents have
not developed a marshaling argument, and failure
to marshal is not included in rule 33(b)'s definition
of a frivolous appeal. Fourth, the Putative Father
has admitted that he stated at the protective order
hearing that he knew, at the time, that the Birth
Mother was in Utah. He contends, however, that he
did not know or have reason to know the Birth
Mother was actually in Utah because following the
protective order hearing the Birth Mother sent him
an e-mail wherein she stated that she had not
moved to Utah. While this may not be a strong argument, it does not appear to be a bad faith argument, especially in light of the fact that the Putative
Father has submitted the e-mail for the court's review.
f 56 Finally, the Putative Father's challenge to the
lack of an evidentiary hearing does not appear to be
made in bad faith. The Putative Father contends
that the district court ruled on facts that the Putative
Father did not know were in dispute. Particularly,
the district court found that the copy of the Arizona
Paternity Order submitted by the Putative Father
was not properly certified. The Putative Father argues on appeal that the district court should have
provided him an opportunity to submit evidence regarding the validity of the Order before the court
ruled on the Order. This appears to be a good faith
argument, although it is irrelevant because, as we
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have stated earlier, the validity of the order has no
bearing on the outcome of the case.

FN4. Reck v. State, 2008 UT 39, % 7, 191
P.3d 4.

U 57 Accordingly, we hold that the Putative Father's
appeal is not frivolous, even though we uphold the
district court's decision.

FN5. (ilew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56,
f 18, 1B1 P.3d791.
FN6. In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT
App 183,19, 27 P.3d 583.

CONCLUSION
*h 58 We affirm the district court's decision. Specifically, we hold that (1) the appeal is not moot because the Putative Father challenged the substance
of the two motions; (2) the due process issue and
the equal protection issue are not properly before us
because the Putative Father failed to preserve them;
(3) the Putative Father failed to comply with Utah
Code section 78-30-4.14; (4) the district court committed harmless error when it declined to give the
Arizona Paternity Order full faith and credit; (5) the
district court provided the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing; and, finally, (6) the Putative Father's appeal is not frivolous.

FN7. This statute has been renumbered and
revised since the proceedings of this case.
Throughout this opinion, we apply the
2005 version of the statute.
FN8. Mad::k v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d
409, 4 0 (Utah 1982) (citations and internal quofetion marks omitted).
FN9. the Adoptive Parents claim that the
Putative Father falsely asserted that he did
not know that the Birth Mother was in
Utah when in fact he did know she was in
Utah.
FNlO.Utah
(2008)

H 59 Affirmed.
U 60 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS,
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion.
FNi. At first blush, these statements appear contradictory-the natural father is unknown, yet he received actual notice of the
Birth Mother's move to Utah. They are reconcilable, however. Because the Birth
Mother was having sexual relations with
two different men around the time she became pregnant, she was unsure which man
was the natural father. Because she gave
both men actual notice of her move to
Utah, it is accurate to state that the
"unknown" father received "actual" notice
of the Birth Mother's move to Utah.

R.App. P.

24(a)(5)(A)-(B)

FN 11. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 17, 192
P.3d 867 (emphasis omitted) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
FN12. hi f 19 ("When a party fails to preserve 4n issue for appeal, we will address
the issue only if (1) the appellant establishes that the district court committed
plain irror, (2) exceptional circumstances
exist, pr (3) in some situations, if the appellant[ raises a claim of ineffective assistance Of counsel in failing to preserve the
issue.' [(citation and internal quotation
marks lomitted)).

FN2. 2008 UT App 152, 184 P.3d 1239.

FN13.|The record citation is not at all helpful because it encompasses the entire record.

FN3.W.1110.

FNH.ptah

Code
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(2008).
FN15.A/.§78-30-4.15(4)(aKd).

FN27. The district court also found two
more problems with the order.

FN16.Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 8-106(G) (2005).
FNJ7.M §8-106(G)(7).
FN18.A/. § 8-106(G)(3) (emphasis added).
FN19JW. § 8-106(G)(7); see also id §
8-106(I)(8) (suggesting that the birth mother include the following language in the
notice to the putative father: "If you do not
file a paternity action under title 25,
chapter 6, article 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, and do not serve the mother within
thirty days after completion of the service
of this notice and pursue the action to
judgment, you cannot bring or maintain
any action to assert any interest in the
child.")FN20. Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT
70, «[ 35, 194 P.3d 956 (quoting State v.
Gallegos. 2007 LT 81, % 12, 171 P.3d
426).

First, the court found that the order was
a "nullity" because it was issued after
the Birth Mother relinquished her rights
to B.G.S., and, accordingly the Putative
Father lost any right to contest the adoption. We agree. The paternity order was
a "nullity" as it pertains to whether the
Putative Father may contest the adoption
of B.G.S. However, that determination
does not mean that we decline to give
the order full faith and credit. As our
analysis indicates, the right to establish
paternity is a separate and distinct right
from the right to contest an adoption.
The establishment of paternity is only
one of many requirements that a putative
father must satisfy before he establishes
the right to contest an adoption. In this
case, the Putative Father failed to meet
the additional requirements, therefore it
is irrelevant whether he was able to establish paternity.

FN21.A/.
FN22. Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic,
LLC, 2008 UT 21. «[ 9, 182 P.3d 333
(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
FN23.Section 8-106 is entitled, "Consent
to adoption; who shall consent; waiver;
consent to the release of information; notification to potential fathers."
FN24. Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT
56,«[18, 181 P.3d791.
FN25. Mori v Mori, 931 P.2d 854, 856
(Utah 1997) (quoting U.S. Const, art. IV, §
1).
FN26.Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78B-15-310

Second, the district court stated that the
order does not "solicit [ ] judicial confidence" for a myriad of technical reasons.
Specifically, the court was concerned
that the order was not executed by a
judge; the copy provided to the Utah
court was not certified; the copy was
handwritten by the Birth Mother; and the
order was amended by the Arizona court,
but the Putative Father failed to present
the amended order to the district court.
None of the reasons stated by the district
court is supported by evidence that the
order failed to comply with Arizona law,
which is the only requirement we must
consider in a full faith and credit analysis.Rule 58(a) of the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure requires only that, "all

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

— P.3d -—
— P.3d -—, 2009 WL 304711 (Utah), 623 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2009 UT 10
(Cite as: 2009 WL 304711 (Utah))

judgments shall be in writing and signed
by a judge or a court commissioner duly
authorized to do so.'The Paternity Order
in this case was in writing and signed by
the deputy clerk. No one has argued that
a deputy clerk is not authorized to sign
an order. Further, no other Arizona requirements have been brought before us.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Arizona requirements have been met.
FN28. In re Complaint Against Smith, 925
P.2d 169, 172 (Utah 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
FN29.Ariz.Rev.Stat.
(Supp.2008).

25-1002(3)(a)

The Adoptive Parents look to Arizona
Revised Statute sections 25-1031 and
25-1002 to argue that the Arizona court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the paternity
order. Section 25-1031(A)(l)-(2) states
that Arizona does not have jurisdiction
to "make an initial child custody determination" unless Arizona is the child's
home state, and a court of another state
does not have jurisdiction over the child.
Section 25-1002(4) defines "child custody proceeding" as "a proceeding, including a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental
rights and protection from domestic violence, in which legal custody, physical
custody or visitation with respect to a
child is an issue or in which that issue
may appear."(Emrjhasis added."! Thus,
the adoptive parents argue that when the
Arizona court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody, it was also
stating that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity because a custody proceeding is statutorily equivalent to a paternity proceeding. However, the jurisdictional statute regards a "child custody
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determination," not a proceeding. Ariz.Rey.Stat. § 25-1031(A). Further, the
definition of a "child custody determination" Idoes not incorporate a paternity determination: a child custody determination is "any judgment, decree or other
order | of a court, including a permanent,
temporary, initial and modification order, for legal custody, physical custody
or visitation with respect to a child."/<i§
25-1002(3)(a). Therefore, a lack of jurisdiction over a custody determination
does not equate to a lack of jurisdiction
over a| paternity determination.
FN30. State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 24,
152 P.Bd 315 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Evans. 2001 UT 22, % 20,

FN31.AHz.Rev.Stat. § 8-106(G)(3) (2005).
FN32.M § 8-106(G)(6).
FN33./4 §8-106.
FN34. This situation should not arise in
Utah because here, "a declaration of paternity may not be signed or filed after
consent to or relinquishment for adoption
has been signed.'TJtah Code Ann. §
78B-15-302(8) (2008).
Utah,2009.
H.U.F. v. W.P.WL
--- P.3d — , 20<ta WL 304711 (Utah), 623 Utah
Adv. Rep-14, 2069 UT 10
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM 2

FILED
'TAN APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 2 h 2009
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Young Living Essential Oils,
LC,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not Fori Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20080624-CA
F I L E D
( S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 2 0 09]

Carlos Marin,
^009~UT App 272}

Defendant and Appellant,

Fourth District, Provo Department, 06040223f7
The Honorable Samuel D. M-cVey
Attorneys:

Scott B. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Barnard N. Madsen and Scott D. preston, Provo, for
Appellee

Before Judges Thome, Orme, and McHugh,
McHUGH, Judge:
Carlos Marin appeal from the trial court's order granting
partial summary judgment n favor of Young jLiving Essential Oils,
LC (Young Living). Marin had defaulted on the parties' contract
by failing to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed"in
the agreement. On appeal, Marin argues that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Young Living,
Marin also contests the trial court's award! of attorney fees and
costs to Young Living. We affirm.
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for
correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Qrvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, i 6 1177 P. 3d 600 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Marin does not deny that he failed to meet the
performance guarantees contained in the cqnfc:ract. Rather, Marin
claims that the trial court erred in granti hg summary judgment
because there was a material issue of fact [relating to whether
Young Living breached its obligation of goofci faith and fair

dealing. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that a
grant of summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact"). In support of this claim, Marin
relies on an affidavit he submitted in opposition to Young
Living's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In his affidavit,
Marin avers that Young Living failed "to provide him with the
marketing tools [that] were necessary for him to satisfy his
performance guarantees." Young Living counters that Marin's
affidavit cannot raise a material issue of fact because it
constitutes parol evidence offered to insert additional terms
into the parties' written agreement.
The parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud
or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract." Tancrren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT
20, 1 11, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). "Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence is
admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms . . . ." Id. In
determining the admissibility of parol evidence the court must
begin by "determining] whether the agreement is integrated."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
An integrated agreement is "a writing . . . constituting a
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement. " Id. ^ 12
(internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen parties have reduced
to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement,
it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that
the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the
parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that "we will not allow extrinsic
evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." Id.
1 16.
Here, the agreement signed by the parties includes a
provision titled "Entire Agreement," which reads, in part,
This Agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the Parties hereto
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous
agreements and understandings of the Parties,
and there are no representations, warranties,
or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof
except as specifically set forth herein.

20080624-CA
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Thus, Marin's agreement with Young Living was integrated because
the parties signed a written contract including a clear
integration clause. See id. Furthermore, Marin makes no claim
that the language of the agreement was ambiguous. Therefore, the
parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to
vary or add terms to the parties' integrated agreement. See id.
1 18.

Marin argues that the parol evidence rule does not prohibit
the introduction of evidence that Young Living breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Marin reasons
that "[b]ecause the covenant was already part of the contract at
issue[,] . . . [his] testimony in support of his claim for breach
of the covenant was not 'offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of1 the contract." "While a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost evjery contract, . . .
this covenant cannot be read to establish r^ew, independent rights
or duties to which the parties did not agre|e ex ante." Qakwood
Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,! K 45, 104 P.3d 1226.
Rather, the covenant is "implied in contracts to protect the
express covenants and promises of the contract." Seare v.
University of Utah Sch. of Med., 882 P.2d 673, 678 (Utah Ct, App.
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Marin reasons that Young Living breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because it failed to provide him
promised marketing tools, but no obligation regarding marketing
tools was made part of the written agreement. Therefore, we
reject Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of
a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties1 agreement
was integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of
"the express covenants and promises of the icontract." Id._
Finally, Marin contests the trial court's award of attorney
fees and costs to Young Living. Young Livifrg counters that Marin
waived his arguments on attorney fees and cpsts on appeal because
his objection was not timely filed in the ttrial court. "To
preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised a
timely and specific objection before the trial court. We will
not address an issue if it is not preserved! or if the appellant
has not established other grounds for seeking review." H.U.F. v.
W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, H 25, 203 P.3d 943 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instructs
that " [objections to [a] proposed order shall be filed within
five days after service." Utah R, Civ, P. 7(f)(2)- Young Living
served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney[]
Fees and Costs on May 27, 2008. Marin then had five days as

20080624-CA
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provided by rule 7(f) (2), see id,, along with an additional three
days following service by mail, see id. R, 6(e), to file his
objection. Marin's objection was not filed until June 11, 2008,
making it
untimely, and his arguments, therefore, are waived on
appeal.l
Accordingly, we affirm.

CarolynC/B. McHugh, Judge(^

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Gregorjf^.^Orme, Judge

1. Marin argues that exceptional circumstances warrant our
consideration of his arguments as to attorney fees and costs
because during the course of the litigation Young Living also
failed to comply with filing deadlines. However, Young Living's
failings do not excuse Marin's untimely filing.

20080624-CA
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ADDENDUM 3

SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111)
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)942-7048
Facsimile: (801)942-7047
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UtTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL
OILS, LC,

*
* AFFIDAVIT OF CARLOS MARIN
*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

CARLOS MARIN,

*

Case No. 060402237

*

Defendant*

*
*

*

Honorable Samuel D. McVey
*

*

Carlos Marin, having been first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1. I am the defendant in this action and! I make this
affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and belief*
2, I was not required to purchase the product which
plaintiff provided to me.

In accordance witft paragraph 4,3 of

the Field Advisor to Executive Board Distributor Agreement at
issue in this case (hereinafter the "Agreement:") , the product was
n

to be used for samples in attracting new Distributor/Leaders."

IT: was never intended by either plaintiff or myself that I would
be obligated to pay for these "samples."
1

3. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling
therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements.
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath
non-licensed wellness enthusiasts.

When plaintiff's

representataves first contacted me, they represented to me thai:
they desired to increase their company's sales volume using a
mainstream network marketing model, i.e., marketing their
products through traditional network marketing sales
representatives directly to the individual consumer.

Plaintiff's

representatives were aware of the fact that I had previously
built a globa] network of more than 500,000 distributors for
Amway Corporation using a mainstream network marketing model.
4. In order to induce me to enter into the Agreement,
plaintiff represented to me that it was Hearing completion of a
new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD, and
other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to as the
''marketing tools") . It was clearly understood by both plaintiff
and myself that these marketing tools would oe absolutely
necessary in order for me to be able to meet my performance
guarantees under the Agreement and it was represented to me that
they would be available for use by February 1, 2005.

No

experienced leader in this industry would agree to these
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performance guarantees without having these marketing tools.
5. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeattedly promised to do
so, plaintiff failed to provide me with any d>f the necessary
marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive brochure
which my distributors were not interested in purchasing).

After

plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools by February 1,
2005, as promised, I spent more than a month working on my own
and in conjunction with the third party vendor hired by
plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting Group, in ordier expedite the
delivery of the marketing tools.

I wrote mote than 20 marketing

and training scripts for video and web based content.

On two

occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine, Florida to work with
Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing videos.

To my knowledge,

the videos have never been completed.
6. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations and
our mutual understanding that these marketing tools were almost
ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that I agreed to
the performance guarantees contained in paragraph 3.4 of the
Agreement.

Without the marketing tools there was virtually no

possibility that I could have met the performance guarantees.
7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to
provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary Young,
plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling,
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my growing concerns
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about my ability to meet the performance guarantees.

Mr. Young

and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to
perform as promised, assured me that my inability to satisfy the
performance guarantees would not affect my receipt of the advance
payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and expressed their
confidence that the marketing tools would be ready for my use by
mid-February to early March 2005.
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's
Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to my failure to
meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee, plaintiff was
considering withholding further payment to me under the
Agreement,

In response, I made it very clear to Mr* Bentley rhat

my failure to satisfy the performance guarantee was the
unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to provide the promised
marketing tools, that I could and would meet my performance
guarantees when the tools were provided, and that I expected
plaintiff to continue making payment to me in accordance with the
terms of the Agreement.

Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff

had failed to perform as promised, represented that plaintiff
anticipated that its website would be completed within
approximately two weeks, and stated that plaintiff would be
making a partial $15,000 payment to me.
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools.
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Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would

xx

get to the

bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.
10, Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide
me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my job, and
despite its requests that I remain patient while it continued in
its efforts to provide the marketing tools, plaintiff failed to
pay me $10,000 of the advance payment due March 15, 2005 in
accordance with paragraph 4 of the Agreement and failed to make
any of the $25,000 advance payment due to be paid to me on April
15, 2005.
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling regarding
plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marketing tools. Mr.
Stirling again assured me that they would be provided soon and
again requested my patience,
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr, Stirling notified me that he had
received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's
folks) '"which indicated they are making progress" on the website.
Mr. Stirling asked me to '"hold tight", A copy of the e-mail is
attached hereto.

Thus, 49 days after plaintiff stopped making

payments to me in accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff
acknowledged that it had still not provided me with the marketing
tools which were absolutely essential for me to be able to do my
job and again requested my continued patiencei,
13, On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not
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provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in order to do
my job, 1 spoke with Mr, Youngr *nd informed him that I believed I
VuH hxmn patient long enough in waiting for the repeatedly
promised marketing tool* and that I could no longer afford to
continue to my contractual relationship with plaintiff*

Carloa Maris
2007,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s

My coiamlMion expires:

> • » m i l S\

i*

#1111^1

k ^ d a y of

ufl* dfriflW*"

KIY1NMAUfi9CE5MfTH

My Commfotfon *****

Undersigned/testifies that a copy of the foreaoino was
served this iZ^^&LW
of April 2007 via first class U,S, Hail,
postage prapald/^addraasad as follows;
Barnard N. Madsen
Trent M. Sutton
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 N. University Avenue
Pravo, Utah 84604
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ADDENDUM 4

FIELD ADVISOR TO EXECUTIVE BOARD DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into on t f a i s / ^ ^ d a y of January, 2005 (the "Effective Date") by
and between Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Company") with its principal place of business
located at 3215 West Executive Parkway, Lehi, Utah 84043 and Carlos Marin^'MARIN^) with
his principal place of business located at Miami, Florida (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
"Parties").

RECITALS
WHEREAS, "Company" develops and sells proprietary nutritional supplements, essential oils and
personal care products ("Products") through a network marketing system throughout the World through a
network of independent distributors referred to herein as Distributors ("Distributors");
WHEREAS, MARIN has proposed becoming a Distributor/Leaderi with sponsorship directly by
John Terhune who has a similar agreement with Company; and
WHEREAS, MARIN has significant experience as a Distributor/Leader and through affiliations
with John Terhune, in being part of quality motivational and training materials;
WHEREAS, Company is desirous of assisting MARIN in devotingjall his time and attention into
recruiting additional distributors underneath him and training them;
WHEREAS, MARIN also has numerous contacts with potential Distributor/Leaders who MARIN
can bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with the Compan}';
NOW THEREFORE, for the mutual promises exchanged herein and for other good and valuable
consideration,, the receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged and agreed herein, the Parties agree as
follows:
1.

Incorporation of Recitals,
The recitals set forth above are hereby incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in their
entirety.

2.

Term.
The term of this Agreement shall commence as of the Effective Dat£ and shall continue for a period
indefinite from the Effective Date.

3.

Duties & Responsibilities of Distributor.
3.1 MARIN will become a new Distributor by signing a current Distributor application and be
bound by Company's current Policies and Procedures, as amended from time to time.
3.2 MARIN shall recruit additional Distributor/Leaders in an attempt to build his organization
extending his host efforts, time and talent to do so.
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3.3 MARIN shall devote his fiill time and attention beginning at execution of this agreement to
recruiting new Distributor/Leaders.
3.4 MARIN will meet the following performance guarantees:
3.4.1

S5000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by February 15th, 2005
$30,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by March 15Ui3 2005
5100,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by April 15th, 2005
$300,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by May 15^, 2005
$600,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by June 15th, 2005
£900,000 worth of cumulative auto ship volume by July 15^', 2005

3.5 MARIN will use his best efforts to attract and sign with Company new Distributor/Leaders.
3.6 MARIN shall abide by the Company's Policies and Procedures, as amended from time to time,
while he maintains his distributorship with the Company.

4.

Compensation.
MARIN shall be paid compensation for monthly downline sales pursuant to the current Company
compensation plan as amended from time to time.
As additional compensation for services rendered under this Agreement, the Parties agree to the
structure of a Fast Cash Program and a Founders Share Program, both of which are explained below.
There will be certain minimum payments which will be advanced to MARIN according to the
following schedule;
S 25,000.00
? 7^000.00
S 25,000.00
$ 25,000.00

due upon execution of this Agreement;
due February 15, 2005;
due March 15, 2005;
due April 15, 2005; for a total expenditure of $ 100,000.00

These monies advanced to MARIN will be offset by any payments due MARIN under the Fast Cash
Program as calculated below. Also, these payments will be offset by any commission payments due
MARIN each month as calculated by the standard commission payout plan. For example, if
Company owes MARIN $3,000.00 by March 15, 2005 for commissions, Company will pay MARIN
$25,000.00 on the following April 5, 2005 date as a minimum guaranteed payment The $22,000.00
difference will be a credit balance Company will maintain over the course of the agreement to be
used to offset future Fast Cash Program payments or future commission run payments. As another
example, if the commission run for April 2005 exceeded the minimum guaranteed payment and
there were no accumulated credit balances, MARIN would receive the larger amount due under the
commission plan payout. If any of the advanced amounts are not repaid by the commission payouts
or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these amounts will be deducted from an}' future
commission payout that exceeds $25,000.00 until these advanced amounts arc paid in full (i.e.,
TvIARIN will receive the Commission payout up to $25,000.00 but anything over this amount will be
used to repay any unpaid advances until paid in full).

?

4.1 Fast Cash Program
On May 5, 2005, a snapshot of the most recent month's bonusirun will be taken of MARIN *s
organization.
a.
MARIN will be paid $1,500.00 each for up to 10 first level distributors (not to
exceed $15,000.00) who have signed on with Company, have Group Volume of greater than
$20,000.00 each and are on autoship.
b.
MARIN will be paid $1,000.00 each for up to ] 001 second level distributors (ten.
each for the Distributor named in (a) above, not to exceed SI00,000.00 total payout) who
have signed on with Company, have Croup Volume of greater than $5,000.00 each and are
on autoship.

This plan is intended to entice MARIN to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary
time to it. Also, it will provide him with a quick resource of cash to ouild the business. The total
payout, based on MARIN's structure as shown on the bonus calculation described above, will not
exceed SI 15,000.00 and will be used first as an offset for any advanced payments made that exceed
the amounts paid by Company under the standard commission payment p]m made to that date.
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Founders' Shares
The purpose of this special bonus, above and beyond the compensation plan, is to provide an
incentive for MARIN to use to recruit the best Distributors/Leaders to join the Company on
his first level. It will allow MARIN to offer this special bonus to those who will go the extra
mile and meet criteria set out below,
a,
By May 1,2005, MARIN will designate 10first-Ihjtedistributors and 50 second lint
distributors who will participate in this program. These 10 first-level Distributors and 50
second-level distributors (no more than 10 per first-level distributors and no more than 50
second-level distributors) who will participate in this program will be entitled to a
"Founder's Share" consisting of a percentage of each distributor's organizational Group
Volume (infinite) as follows:

b.

i.

MARIN

=0.40 of GV

ii.

Top 10 (first-level to MARIN)

= 030% of GV

iii.

Top 50 (5 first level to each Top 10)

= p.30% of GV

Each participating distributor's Founder's Share is earned as follows:
i.
A distributor is entitled to accrue a payment of one-third of their Founder's
Share upon achieving "Diamond" (or first level Diamond) status, two-thirds upon
achieving "Crown Diamond" (or second level Diamond) status, and full payment
upon achieving "Hope Diamond" (or third level Diamond) status.
ii.
If a Distributor fails to qualify in any month under the compensation plan as
Diamond, Crown Diamond or Hope Diamond as described above, that distributor
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will not be entitled to accrue any Founder's Share payment for that month according
to this plan. In addition, the Distributor will only be entitled to accrue a payment
for the level the distributorship is currently at for that month, even if that Distributor
had previously attained a higher level in a prior month level (e.g., a Diamond will
only be entitled to accrue a one-third share payment even if that Distributorship
previously qualified as a Crown Diamond). When a Distributor meets the described
qualifications, that Distributor will accrue the Founder's Share entitlement. The
Company will pay The Founder's Share Program payments to each qualified
Distributor who has accrued an entitlement at the end of each calendar year.
iti.
A Founder's Share is unique to MARIN or to the individual initially named
by MARIN in this program and cannot be sold, devised, given, bequeathed,
distributed or in any manner transferred to any other person or entity, even if the
Distributorship is in the name of an entity. A Share cannot be awarded in a divorce
action or it becomes null and void. The Founder's Shares are unique personal
service agreements and are entered into between the Company and the individuals
named in accordance with subparagraph V of this section.
iv.
A Founder's Shares is a unique personal services contract and is not a
property right or an equity share. Should anyone entitled to a Founder's Share
attempt to transfer said share, retire, transfer the distributorship, suffer incapacity, or
death, it will constitute a complete termination of all participation in the program.
Said Founder's Share becomes null and void as to all parties and no further
payments will be made pursuant to that particular agreement.
43

Product Entitlement
MARIN shall be entitled to a product credit of $5,000.00 for January 2005 and $5,000.00 for
February 2005. This product credit is to be used for samples in attracting new
Distributor/Leaders and expires at the end of each month in which it is granted. This credit
does not count towards product purchase requirements for qualification purposes.

5- Confidential information.
5.1 The Parties recognize that each may disclose to the other, certain confidential information, as
herein, that is considered a valuable trade secret or proprietary of the disclosing party. The
Parties specifically agree that each will not at any time, during or after the term of this
Agreement, in any manner, either directly or indirectly, use, divulge, disclose, or communicate
to any person, firm, or corporation, any confidential information of any kind, nature, or
Description concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of the other
(hereinafter referred to as "Confidential Information")5.2

Confidential Information which may or may not be disclosed during the performance of this
Agreement also includes but is not limited to: "Company" genealogies (being the information
held by Company related to its Distributors, including without limitation its relationship with
each of its Distributors, the sponsoring of each Distributor, the Distributor's upline and
downline, charts, data reports, names,, addresses and telephone numbers and other identification
materials pertaining to the same, historical purchasing information for each Distributor),
proprietary product information which may from time-to~tixne be made known to MARIN,
product formulations and ingredients, the names, buying habits, or practices of any Company
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customers or Distributors; Company marketing methods and related data; the names of
Company's vendors or suppliers; costs of materials; costs of its Products generally, the prices
Company obtains or has obtained or at which it sells or has sold its Products or services;
manufacturing and sales costs; lists or other written records used in Company's business;
compensation paid to its Distributors and employees and other terms of consultancy thereof;
manufacturing processes; scientific studies or analyses other than those published for use by
Company for the benefit of its Distributors, details of training methods, new products or new
uses for old products, merchandising or sales techniques, contracts and licenses, business
systems, computer programs, or any other confidential information of, about, or concerning the
business of Company; its manner of operation or other confidential data of any kind, nature or
description.
5.3 The term "Confidential Information" shall also include information conveyed orally unless the
party disclosing the oral information notifies the other party that such information is not
confidential and is not subject to this Agreement.
5 4 The term ''Confidential Information" does not include information thai fa) is or becomes
generally available to the public through no fault of the receiving party, (b) was known to the
receiving party prior to its nondisclosure hereunder, as demonstrated by files in existence at the
time of the disclosure, (c) becomes known to the receiving party, without restriction, from a
source other than the disclosing party, without breach of this Agreement by the receiving party
and otherwise not in violation of the disclosing party's rights, or (d) is explicitly approved for
release by written authorization of the disclosing party.
5.5 The Parties agree that each shall turn over to the other all equipment, notebooks, documents,
memoranda, reports, notes, files, sample books, correspondence, lists, other written and graphic
records, and the like, affecting or relating to the business of the other, which is used to prepare,
construct, possess, control or otherwise come into the other's possession during the term of this
Agreement concerning any process, apparatus or products manufactured, sold, used, developed,
investigated or considered by the other concerning the Confidential information or concerning
any other business or activity of the other shall remain at ail times the property,' of disclosing
party and shall be delivered to disclosing party upon termination of this Agreement for any
reason or at ar>y time upon request.
5.6 MARIN agrees that, during the term of this Agreement or upon termination thereof, and if
requested by Company to do so, MARIN will sign an appropriMe list of any and all Confidential
Information of Company of which MARIN has knowledge or about which MARIN has acquired
information. All personnel, both contract and employees, representatives, agents and assigns
thereof affiliated with MARIN with access to Confidential Information as described hereunder
shall be admonished by MARIN regarding the requirement for confidentiality of the same.
5.7 The Parties agree that, as between them, all Confidential Infonrftation is important, material,
trade secret, highly sensitive and valuable to the other's business and its goodwill and is
transmitted to the other in strictest confidence.
5.2 In the event of breach or threatened breach of this Section by ejther Party, the non-breaching
party will be entitled to an injunction restraining the other party from disclosing, in whole or in
part, any Confidential Information to any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity to
whom the non-breaching party's Confidential Information, in whole or in part, has been
disclosed or threatened to be disclosed. Nothing contained herein will be construed as limiting
the non-bneaching party from, or prohibiting the non-breacfaing party from, pursuing any other
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remedies available to it for such breach, or threatened breach, including recovery of damages
from the breaching part}'.
All provisions of Section 5, including any and all sub-secrions thereof, shall survive ti^e termination
or expiration of this Agreement

Indemnification.
6.3 MARIN hereby agrees to indemnify and save Company and hold Company harmless In respect
of all causes of action, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss and damage (including
consequential loss) suffered or incurred by Company (including legal fees) arising from any
willful or grossly negligent act or omission of MARIN or his employees, servants and agents or
arising from contravention by MARIN of any of its employees, servants, and agents of any of
the terms and conditions imposed on MARJN pursuant to this Agreement.
6.2 Company hereby agrees to indemnify and save MARIN and hold MARftf hannless in respeci of
all causes of actions, liabilities, costs, charges and expenses, loss and damage suffered or
incurred by MARIN (including legal fees) arising from any willful or grossly negligent act or
omission of Company or its employees, servants and agents and arising from contravention by
Company of any of its employees, servants, and agents of any of the terms and conditions
imposed on Company pursuant to this Agreement.
6.3 No party shall be liable to any other party hereunder for any claim covered by insurance, except
to the extent that the liability of such party exceeds the amount of such insurance coverage.
Nothing in this clause 6.3 shall be construed to reduce insurance coverage to which any party
may otherwise be entitled.
Representations.
7.1

MARIN has obtained all licenses, permits and other requisite authorizations and has taken
all actions required by applicable laws or governmental regulations in connection with its
business as now condi^-ted-

7.2

Each of MARIN's employees, consulting and professional personnel assigned to perform the
Services as contemplated hereunder shall have the proper skill, training and background so
as to be able to perform the services in a competent and professional manner and all work
shall be so performed.

7.3

MARJN represents that it is a business in good standing and that its relationship with its
suppliers and customers is good.

1A

MARIN represents that he has successful, favorable experience in providing Services such
as the duties as contemplated herein.

Default and Termination.
8.1 Cure
In the event any Party to this Agreement shall fail to timely perform or keep any undertaking to
which it has agreed herein, then the other party may, upon ten (10) days notice in writing,
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during which period the party against whom such default is contended may cure such
contended default without affecting any other provision of thfs Agreement, after which, if such
default has not been cured, such party may, should it so electj terminate this Agreement and sue
for damages.

8.2 The present Agreement shall remain binding on each of the parties regardless of any iransfer of
shares in the capital stock of either party (whether as betweep existing shareholders, to related
shareholders or to new shareholders or any combination thereof), de facto or de jure change of
conrrol of either party, amalgamation with one or more corporations, restructuring of the capital
stock of either part)' or other corporate reorganization of either party,
8.3 The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall entitle Company to terminate
this Agreement (i) without further notice to MARIN where the default raised cannot possibly be
cured, or (ii) within ten (10) days of the receipt of written notice of such event where the default
in question has not been cured, or (iii) at events which list a 4ate for performance to take place
and written notice of said default is sent to the offending party:
8.3.1

should MARIN make an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, file a petition in
bankruptcy, be adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt file a petition or apply to any
tribunal for any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion
of its property, commence any proceeding under any law or statute of any jurisdiction
respecting insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement or readjustment of
debt, dissolution, winding-up, composition or liquidation, or otherwise take advantage
of any bankruptcy or insolvency legislation whethejr now or hereafter in effect, or if
any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator df any substantial portion of its
property is appointed;

S32

should MARIN be incapable of signing new Distributor/Leaders or attaining the
volume by the dates set out in the Duties and Responsibilities section; or

83.3

should MARIN intentionally violate any of the provisions of this agreement

8.4 The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall entitle MARIN to terminate fh,,<?
Agreement (i) without further notice to Company where the default raised cannot possibly be
cured and (ii) within ten (10) business days of the receipt of Written notice of such event where
the default in question may be cured:
$>AA should the Company make an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, file a petition
in bankruptcy, be adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt, file a petition or apply to any
tribunal for any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion
of its property, commence any proceeding under any law or statute of any jurisdiction
respecting insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement or readjustment of
debt^ dissolution, winding-up, composition or liquidation, or otherwise take advantage
of any bankruptcy or insolvency legislation whether now or hereafter in effect, or if
any receiver, trustee, liquidator or sequestrator of any substantial portion of its
property is appointed;
8.4.2

should the Company cease business operations for any reason for a period of more
than sixty (60) days in any Contract Year or for |a period of thirty (30) or more
consecutive days;
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8.4.3

should the Company fail to make two (2) or more payments as set out in the payment

schedule; or
8.4.4

should the Company fail to pay when due any other amount due to MARIN hereunder
and fail to remedy such default within fourteen (14) days following receipt of written
notice thereof;

8.5 No person acting for the benefit of the creditors of either party or any receiver, trustee, liquidator,
sequestrator, trustee in bankruptcy, sheriff, officer of a court or person in possession of either
parry's assets or business shall have any right to continue the performance of this Agreement in
any circumstances whatsoever.

9.

Notices.
All notices required under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be sent to the Parties by
United States Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requesxed, postage prepaid to the addresses first
written above.

10.

No Agency.
This Agreement does not constitute a joint venture, partnership or employment relationship of any
kind between MARIN and Company. MARTN shall at all times be considered an independent
contractor of Company as to the duties and responsibilities contemplated hereunder. As such,
MARTN agrees that during the term of this agreement, it will be responsible for paying any amounts
attributed to any compensation paid to MARIN to any and all taxing authorities as required by law.
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Assignment.
Company may assign and transfer this Agreement, or all or an)' part of its rights as provided herein
to any person, firm or corporation, without limitation, and this Agreement shall be binding on and
inure to the benefit of the parties and their successors, representatives and assigns.
Similarly, the Parties acknowledge that this is a personal services contract and understand mat
MARIN and this contract cannot be assigned by MARIN, The parties do acknowledge that MARIN
may personally perform the duties and responsibilities pursuant to the contract under the auspices of
a legal entity.

12.

Waiver.
A waiver by either party to perform or enforce any term or condition of this Agreement in any
instance shall not be deemed or construed to be a waiver of the continuing validity or enforceability
of such term or condition.

13.

Authority.
The Parties represent that they have full capacity and authority to grant all rights and assume all
obligations they have granted and assumed under this Agreement.

14.

Severability.
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Any portion of tin's Agreement which may be prohibited or unenforceable in any applicable
jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the exteclt of such prohibition or
unenforceability, but shall not invalidate the remaining portions of'such provisions or the other
provisions hereof or affect any such provisions or portion thereof'^ any other jurisdiction.
3-5.

Captions.
The headings of the sections in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference and
are not inxended and shall not be deemed for any purpose whatsoever to modify or explain or place
constriction upon any of the provisions of this Agreement

16.

Governing Law.
The Parties hereto agree that this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah
without regard to the conflicts of law principles. The Parties further! agree that exclusive jurisdiction
and venue to enforce this Agreement shall be in a state or federal ccjwrt of appropriate jurisdiction in
Utah.

17.

Counterparts.
This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an
original but all of which together will constitute one and the same djocument.

38-

Entire Agreement.
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties hereto pertaining to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements and understandings of the
Parties, and there are no representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in
connection with the subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein. No supplement,
modification, amendment, waiver or termination of this Agreement Ishall be binding unless executed
in writing and signed by the Parties hereto. This Agreement does not supersede, modify or affect
die Distributor Agreement or the Policies and Procedures and MARJIN wij] be bound separately by
thos« agreements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have duly executed this Agreement on the date first written
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ADDENDUM 5

Westlaw*
Page

876N.E.2d637
172 Ohio App.3d 609, 876 N.E.2d 637, 2007 -Ohio- 3823
(Cite as: 172 Ohio App.3d 609, 876 N.E.2d 637)

|1] Evidence 157 ©=?417(19)
Court of Appeals of Ohio,
Sixth District, Ottawa County.
UNITED STATES CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION et al., Appellants,
v.
HARBOR BAY ESTATES, LTD. et al., Appellee.
No. OT-06-019.
Decided July 27, 2007.
Background: Developer brought action against adjoining landowner for breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and implied easement after landowner failed
to connect contiguous water and sewer utilities into
developer's residential development and dedicate
such to county within 60 days. Landowner filed
counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith, and a claim based on assignment of the easement to development, asserting that
development materially breached easement agreement by failing to tender $45,000 due in compensation for the easement. The Court of Common Pleas,
Ottawa County, No. 04-CVH-005, granted
landowner's motion for a directed verdict and granted partial summary judgment to landowner on
counterclaim. Developer appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Osowik, J., held
that:
(1) letter containing a 60-day time frame was inadmissible;
(2) landowner performed contractual duties within
a reasonable time as required by agreement; and
(3) landowner performed its obligations under easement agreement such that developer breached the
agreement when it failed to tender $45,000 to
landowner.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157X1(A|) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157kf 17 Matters Not Included in Writing
or for Which It Does Not Provide
J57k417(19) k. Duration of Contract
and Time for Performance. Most Cited Cases
Easement contact between developer and adjacent
landowner was a clear, unambiguous, and complete
representation of their intent such that letter containing a 60-day time frame was inadmissible in
breach of contract action by application of the doctrine of contract merger and the parol-evidence
rule, although agreement did not contain a time
frame; agreement indicated that landowner granted
developer an easement to allow developer to construct, maintain repair, replace, relocate, and operate utility lines and facilities for the purpose of obtaining utility service and indicated that developer
agreed to pay $45,000 on completion of construction, installation, and tapping of the utilities, and
agreement contained a merger clause stating it constituted the complete agreement of the parties.

|2| Evidence W €^397(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parbl or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157X1(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k3^7 Contracts in General
137k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The parol evidence rule states that absent fraud,
mistake or otheif invalidating cause, the parties' final written integration of their agreement may not
be varied, contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements,
or prior written Agreements.
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[3J Evidence 157 €^>397(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
I57k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The parol evidence rule prevents a party from introducing extrinsic evidence of negotiations that occurred before or while the agreement was being reduced to its final form.
|4| Evidence 157 €^>397(1)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Parol evidence is generally not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous written
contract.
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95k212(2) k. Time for Performance
Where No Time Is Specified. Most Cited Cases
Evidence 157 €^>417(19)
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
l.57XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding
to Terms of Written Instrument
] 57k417 Matters Not Included in Writing
or for Which It Does Not Provide
J57k417(19) k. Duration of Contract
and Time for Performance. Most Cited Cases
Where no time of performance is specified in a contract, the legal effect is that it is to be performed
within a reasonable time and parol evidence is not
admissible to show an agreement that it shall be
performed at a particular time.
[7] Contracts 95 €^>213(1)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(D) Place and Time
95k213 Time of Performance
95k213(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases

[5| Contracts 95 €^175(1)

Easements 141 €^>38

95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 175 Evidence to Aid Construction
95k 175(1) k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
Courts will generally presume that the intent of the
parties to a contract resides in the language they
chose to employ in the agreement.

141 Easements
14 MI Extent of Right, Use, and Obstruction
141 k38 k. Relation Between Owners of
Dominant and Servient Tenements in General. Most
Cited Cases
Adjacent landowner performed contractual duties
of construction, installation, and tapping of utilities
within a reasonable time as required under agreement with developer that granted developer a utility
easement for its development, although landowner
did not connect contiguous water and sewer utilities
into the development and dedicate such county
within 60 days of the agreement; contract did not
indicate that time was of the essence or contain any
time frame for performance, and landowner did not

[6] Contracts 95 €^>212(2)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(D) Place and Time
95k212 Reasonable Time
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intentionally refuse to file the dedication to suppress the sales and development.
i8| Contracts 95 €^>211
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(D) Place and Time
95k211 k. Time as of the Essence of the
Contract. Most Cited Cases
The general rule as to contracts is that the time of
performance is not of the essence unless the parties
have included an express stipulation to that effect
or such a requirement can be implied from the
nature or circumstances of the contract.
[9| Contracts 95 €^212(1)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(D) Place and Time
95k2J 2 Reasonable Time
95k212(J) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Reasonable time for a contract's performance is not
measured by hours, days, weeks, months or years,
but is to be determined from the surrounding conditions and circumstances which the parties contemplated at the time the contract was executed.
[10] Contracts 95 €=^168
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 168 k. Terms Implied as Part of Contract. Most Cited Cases
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be used to make an end run around the parol
evidence rule.
[Ill Easements 141 €^>38
141 Easements
14 III Extent of Right, Use, and Obstruction
141 k38 k. Relation Between Owners of
Dominant and Servient Tenements in General. Most
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Cited Cases
Adjacent landowner performed its obligations under easement agreement with developer when developer succeeded in tapping the utilities on the
easement property, and thus developer breached the
agreement whqn it failed to tender $45,000 to
landowner as required under the agreement.
[12] Contracts 95 €>^>326
95 Contracts
95VI Action^ for Breach
95k32fi k. Grounds of Action. Most Cited
Cases
Breach of contract occurs when a party demonstrates the existence of a binding contract or agreement, the nonbreaching party performed its contractual obligations^ the other party failed to fulfill its
contractual obligations without legal excuse, and
the nonbreaching party suffered damages as a result
of the breach.
**638 John E. B|reen, for appellants.
Erik G. Chappell, Toledo, for appellee.
OSOWIK, Judge;.
*612 (TI 1} Thi& is an appeal from a judgment of
the Ottawa County Common Pleas Court, which
granted a motion for directed verdict in favor of appellee, Harbor Bay Estates, Ltd. The trial court dismissed all clainjs filed by appellants and granted
partial summary! judgment in favor of appellee on
his counterclaim in the amount of $45,000. For the
reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial pourt.
**639 {^[ 2} The| following undisputed facts are relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Appellant
United States Construction Corporation ("USCC")
is a Florida corporation registered in Ohio as a realestate-development company. In December 1999,
USCC acquired a|n undeveloped tract of land in Ottawa County, Ohio. This property did not contain
utility service.
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{H 3} On July 31, 2003, USCC transferred this land
to appellant The Cove on the Bay L.L.C. ("The
Cove"). This land was developed into The Cove, a
residential development. Greg Spatz is the sole
principal of both entities.

Specifically, Paragraph 3 of the agreement provides
that the "Grantee shall pay Grantor the sum of
Forty-Five Thousand Dollars on completion of
Grantor's construction, installation, and tapping of
the Utilities."

{U 4} Appellee, Harbor Bay, is an Ohio limited-liability company that engages in residential development. Its land is contiguous to appellants' land.
Scott Prephan is the principal of Harbor Bay.

{H 8} On January 3, 2004, appellants initiated this
lawsuit against Harbor Bay and set forth claims of
breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing, misrepresentation, and implied easement. It was appellants' contention that appellee
breached the agreement by failing to connect contiguous water and sewer utilities into appellants'
residential development and dedicate such to Ottawa County within 60 days.

{H 5} In May 2003, USCC began to develop The
Cove. The principal, Spatz, negotiated with Prephan to obtain an easement over Harbor Bay. In
June 2003, Harbor Bay entered into an easement
agreement with USCC. Pursuant to the agreement,
Harbor Bay granted USCC a 30-foot-wide utility
easement ("the easement property"). The grant of
easement provided:
{H 6} "Grantor grants and conveys to Grantee, its
successors and assigns, a non-exclusive, perpetual
easement in, over, across, and under the Easement
Property for the benefit of Grantee and Grantee's
Property for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, repairing, replacing, relocating, and operating
utility lines and facilities, as defined later in this
paragraph 2, for the distribution of water and sewerage, together with the right to construct lines,
pump valves, and lift stations, and all other necessary equipment and appurtenances solely in accordance with plans and specifications reviewed and approved by the Ottawa County, Sanitary Engineering
Department ('the Utilities'); provided, however,
*613 that all the Utilities shall be connected underground. Grantor shall retain the right to use any surface area of the Easement Property for purposes
that are consistent with the grant of the easement
herein. Grantee shall not exercise its rights with respect to the Easement Property to the exclusion of
the Grantor or to such an extent that it will have the
effect of unreasonably interfering with the Grantor's
rights in the Easement Property."
{H 7} In exchange for the easement rights, Harbor
Bay was to receive sizable financial consideration.

{U 9} Harbor Bay claimed that it had performed its
obligations under the agreement by allowing The
Cove to construct and install a tap to the utilities on
the easement property. In his trial testimony, Prephan asserted that the agreement between Harbor
Bay and USCC did not contain a time of performance or require Harbor Bay to file its plot plan or
dedicate its utilities to Ottawa County at a specific
time.
{U 10} Harbor Bay filed counterclaims against appellants. The counterclaims asserted**640 breach
of contract, breach of covenant of good faith, and a
claim based on USCC's assignment of the easement
to The Cove. It was asserted that The Cove materially breached the agreement by failing to tender
$45,000 due in compensation for the easement.
{H 11} The fact that the agreement is silent as to the
time of performance is not disputed. However, appellants assert that pursuant to negotiations between
the parties, Harbor Bay had a duty to extend water
and sewer lines to the property line of The Cove
and to ensure dedication of the utilities within a
reasonable time. In his trial testimony, Spatz indicated that a letter prepared by him, dated June 5,
2006, and sent to Prephan, without objection to its
terms, manifests the intention of a 60-day time
frame. He further contends that the agreed sum of
$45,000 was to ensure that the construction process
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was expedited and dedication of the utilities was
completed within this time frame.
(H 12} On September 9, 2005, Harbor Bay filed a
motion for summary judgment and sought dismissal
of all claims against it asserted by appellants and
judgment in the amount of $45,000 on its counterclaim.
*614 fl[ 13} On November 28, 2005, this matter
was heard before the Ottawa County Common
Pleas Court. At the close of appellants' case, the trial court rendered an oral decision and granted a directed verdict in favor of Harbor Bay. This decision
was formalized on February 17, 2006.
{H 14} On February 21, 2006, the trial court granted Harbor Bay partial summary judgment on its
counterclaim for a judgment against USCC, in the
amount of $45,000, interests, and costs. On May
18, 2006, the trial court dismissed without prejudice all remaining counterclaims asserted by Harbor Bay.
fl| 15} On June 14, 2006, appellants filed a timely
notice of appeal and set forth the following three
assignments of error:
{U 16} "A. The lower court erred to the prejudice of
appellant U.S. Construction when it granted a directed verdict by failing to properly identify a reasonable time for performance under the contract
between the parties.
{U 17} "B. The lower court erred, as a matter of
law, when it granted a directed verdict against appellant but failed to consider parol evidence regarding the time of performance under the contract
between the parties that was embodied in a written
letter issued one week prior thereto.
{H 18} "C. The lower court erred in granting summary judgment against appellant U.S. Construction
on Appellee's claim for payment of $45,000.00 under the contract."
{U 19} There are two preliminary issues we must
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address before we can proceed to the merits of appellants' arguments. First, analyzing the assignments in the ojrder presented by appellants is not
conducive to our analysis. Our judgment on appellants' second assignment of error is determinative
of the validity j)f appellants' first assignment of error. Accordingly, we will address these assignments
of error in reverse order and then proceed to the
third. Second, in their first and second assignments
of error, appel ants challenge the trial court's decision granting a directed verdict in favor of Harbor
Bay. A motion for directed verdict pursuant to a
Civ.R. 50 is not the applicable standard in a nonjury trial. Tewarson v. Simon (2001), 141 Ohio
App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176; Ramco Specialties, Inc. v. Pansegraii (1998), 134 Ohio App.3d
513,520,731 N.E.2d714.
{K 20} It is well established that in a bench trial, the
proper motion fpr judgment**641 at the conclusion
of a plaintiffs! case is one for dismissal under
Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Harris v. Cincinnati (1992). 79
Ohio App.3d 163, 607 N.E.2d 15; Janell, Inc. v.
Woods (1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 216, 24 0.0.3d
266, 435 N.E|2d 1138; Altimari v. Campbell
(1978), 56 Ohij App.2d 253, 10 0.0.3d 268, 382
N.E.2d 1187; *K\SJacobs v. 3d. of Cty. Commrs.
(1971), 27 Ohij> App.2d 63, 56 0.0.2d 245, 272
N.E.2d 635. Thus, we will construe it as one for involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2).
{H 21} In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2), the trial court weighs
the evidence and resolves any conflict therein, and
it may render judgment in favor of the defendant if
the plaintiff hai shown no right to relief. Ramco
Specialties, Inc\, 134 Ohio App.3d at 520, 731
N.E.2d 714. Uppn review, a trial court's judgment
should not be reversed unless erroneous as a matter
of law or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{K 22} Therefore, if the record contains competent,
credible evidence supporting the findings of fact
and conclusions! of law rendered by the trial court
judge, this judgment will not be set aside. CE.
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Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio
St.2d 279, 8 0.0.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578.
[1] (U 23} In their second assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred when it
failed to consider parol evidence regarding the time
of performance under the contract between the
parties that was embodied in a written letter issued
one week prior to the contact.
{K 24} The trial court found that the utility agreement was unambiguous and that introduction of the
June 5, 2003 letter would contradict the terms in it.
It stated that pursuant to the doctrine of contract
merger, 'The parties cannot rely on prior statements or agreements to supplement the written
agreement without varying its terms." Accordingly,
the trial court held that parol evidence cannot be
used to contradict the language of the contract.
[2] {U 25} We concur with the trial court. The parol
evidence rule states that "absent fraud, mistake or
other invalidating cause, the parties' final written
integration of their agreement may not be varied,
contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior
or contemporaneous oral agreements, or prior written agreements." Galmish v. Cicchini (2000), 90
Ohio St.3d 22, 27, 734 N.E.2d 782, quoting 11 Williston on Contracts (4 Ed. 1999) 569-570, Section
33:4.
[3][4] {H 26} This is a common-law principle that
operates to prevent a party from introducing extrinsic evidence of negotiations that occurred before
or while the agreement was being reduced to its final form. Bellman v. Am. Internatl. Group, 163
Ohio App.3d 540, 2005-Ohio-5250, 839 N.E.2d
430, % 7; Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Soc. Natl. Bank
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 440, 662 N.E.2d 1074.
As such, parol evidence is generally not admissible
to contradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous
written contract. Id.
[5][6] {H 27} Appellants argue that the June 5, 2003
letter, containing a 60-day time limit, should be
considered to explain the parties' intent and the
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terms of the agreement. They contend that since the
letter does not add to, vary, or *616 contradict the
terms of the contract, it is not barred by the parolevidence rule. However, courts will "[generally * *
* presume that the intent of the parties to a contract
resides in the language they chose to employ in the
agreement." Shifrin v. Forest Enis., Inc. (1992), 64
Ohio St.3d 635, 638, 597 N.E.2d 499; **642Kelfy
v. Med. Life Ins. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 130,
132, 31 OBR 289, 509 N.E.2d 411. Furthermore,
when no time of performance is specified in a contract, the legal effect is that it is to be performed
within a reasonable time and "parol evidence is not
admissible to show an agreement that it shall be
performed at a particular time." Buschmeyer v. Advance Mach. Co. (1916), 7 Ohio App. 202, 216.
{H 28} The doctrine of contract merger, a corollary
to the parol-evidence rule, further weakens appellants' argument. In TRINOVA Corp. v. Pilkington
Bros., P.LC
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 271, 638
N.E.2d 572, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
"Contract integration provides that where the
parties' intent is sought to be ascertained from several writings, a prior writing will be rejected in favor of a subsequent one if the latter writing contains the whole of the parties' agreement. If the subsequent agreement is complete and unambiguous on
its face, parol evidence is inadmissible to show a
contrary intent of the parties."
{U 29} In the case at bar, Paragraph 8 of the utility
agreement provides: "This agreement contains the
entire agreement of the parties. This agreement
shall not be amended, changed or modified or any
provision waived or discharged, in whole or in part,
unless that agreement is in writing and duly signed
by the parties hereto."
{H 30} Thus, by signing the agreement, it is presumed that appellants incorporated all prior negotiations and agreements into the final agreement and
that the final agreement represents the intent and
full agreement between the parties. Fontbank, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc. (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 801,
808, 742 N.E.2d 674; Figetakis v. Smith (Mar. 4,
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1998), 9th Dist. No. 18393, 1998 WL 114473; Natl.
City Bank v. Donaldson (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d
241,245, 642 N.E.2d 58.
{H 31} The clear language of the agreement indicates that Harbor Bay granted USCC an easement to
allow appellants to construct, maintain, repair, replace, relocate, and operate utility lines and facilities for the purpose of obtaining utility service on
their property. It is also clear that USCC agreed to
pay Harbor Bay the sum of $45,000 on completion
of construction, installation, and tapping of the utilities. This agreement does not provide a time for
performance or include a reference to a timeframe
for dedication of the utilities to Ottawa County.
H 32} We acknowledge that the June 5, 2003 letter
provides a time for performance. However, it predates the formalized agreement and the record shows
that appellants had an attorney, had time to review
the agreement, and had the opportunity to bargain
for its terms. Therefore, the agreement is a *617
clear, unambiguous, and complete representation of
the parties' intent, and parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict its terms.
{\ 33} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did
not err in holding that the proposed letter was inadmissible by application of the doctrine of contract
merger and the parol-evidence rule. This decision
and subsequent grant of dismissal in favor of Harbor Bay was not against the manifest weight of
evidence or contrary to law. Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is not well taken.
[7] {^| 34} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred to the prejudice of USCC when it failed to identify a reasonable time for performance under the contract and
granted a directed verdict in favor of Harbor Bay.
H 35} Under this assignment of error, appellants
assert two arguments. First, they contend that the
sole intent of agreement**643 between the parties
was to expedite the construction process and ensure
water service to USCC's property on a timely basis.
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They propose tr^at 60 days is a reasonable time and
that the construction, development, and sale of appellants' property could not have been established
without it.
{\ 36} Second,Iappellants contend that Harbor Bay
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by
refusing to work with USCC to effectuate the purpose of their agreement. Appellants argue that Harbor Bay intentionally refused to file the dedication
for almost seven months to suppress the sales and
development off USCC's property and to extort additional concessions from USCC before it would
file.
{\ 37} The tri^l court held that since the 60-day
time period is not part of the written agreement
between the parties, appellants' entire case fails. We
agree.
[8] {\ 38} The! general rule as to contracts is that
the time of performance is not of the essence unless
the parties have; included an express stipulation to
that effect or such a requirement can be implied
from the nature or circumstances of the contract.
Brown v. Brown (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 781, 784,
630N.E.2d763i
[9] {^1 39} "Reasonable time for a contract's performance is not measured by hours, days, weeks,
months or year$, but is to be determined from the
surrounding conditions and circumstances which
the parties contemplated at the time the contract
was executed." Miller v. Bealer (1992), 80 Ohio
App.3d 180, 182, 608 N.E.2d 1133.
{K 40} It is undisputed that this contract involved a
grant of a utility easement for the development of
real property. The record indicates that all parties
had full knowledge of this fact. However, the
agreement at is$ue does not indicate *618 that time
is of the essence. If time was of the essence, it
should have beein made an essential part of the contract terms.
{H 41} Additionally, the record does not indicate
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that Harbor Bay failed to perform within a reasonable time or that it intentionally refused to file the
dedication to suppress the sales and development of
USCC's property. On the contrary, according to the
trial testimony of Spatz, the construction, installation, and tapping of the utilities was completed on
or before July 1,2003.
[10] {1| 42} Having held above that the trial court
did not err in finding that the letter indicating a
60-day time limit was inadmissible, there is nothing
in the record to indicate that Harbor Bay failed to
perform its obligation as set forth in the clear language of the agreement. Furthermore, "[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot
be used to make an end run around the parol evidence rule." McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., 8th
Dist. No. 79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL
31875200, f 24. Accordingly, appellants' first assignment of error is not well taken.
[11] (K 43} In appellants' third assignment of error,
they assert that the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment against USCC on Harbor Bay's
claim for payment of $45,000 under the contract.
fl[ 44} In review of a trial court's summary-judgment decision, this court employs a de novo standard of review, applying the same standard used as
the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts.
(1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198;
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d
102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Summary judgment will
be granted when there remains no genuine issue of
material fact and, when construing the evidence
most strongly in favor of the nonmoving**644
party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that being that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C).

party demonstrates the existence of a binding contract or agreement; the nonbreaching party performed its contractual obligations; the other party
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations without
legal excuse; and the nonbreaching party suffered
damages as a result of the breach." Lawrence v. Lorain Cty. Community College (1998), 127 Ohio
App.3d 546, 549, 713 N.E.2d 478; Circuit Solutions, Inc. v. Mueller Elec. Co., 9th Dist. No.
05-CA-008775,
2006-Ohio-4321,
2006
WL
2390269, % 7.
*619 {lj 47} In order for appellants to prevail in
their argument, they would need to show that Harbor Bay failed to perform its contractual obligations
without legal excuse. The trial court held that for
the reasons clearly set forth and well articulated in
defendant's memorandum, "Defendant is entitled to
judgment against Plaintiff on its counterclaim in the
amount of $45,000.00, interest and costs." This decision was based on the finding that Harbor Bay
had performed the terms of the agreement.
{H 48} We concur with the trial court's determination. Appellants failed to sustain the argument of a
60-day time limit. Appellants cannot show that
Harbor Bay breached the agreement. As such, Harbor Bay performed its obligations under the agreement when appellants succeeded in tapping the utilities on the easement property. Therefore, appellants breached the agreement when it failed to
tender $45,000.
{^1 49} Accordingly, there is no issue of fact to be
determined. Appellants' third assignment of error is
not well taken.

{\ 45} Appellants argue that this case should not
have been taken away from the jury's consideration
pertaining to the allegations of breach of contract
arguably still under dispute.

{% 50} On consideration whereof, the judgment of
the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay costs of this
appeal pursuant to App.R.24. Judgment for the
clerk's expense incurred in preparation of the record, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the
appeal is awarded to Ottawa County.

[12] {^ 46} Breach of contract occurs when "a

Judgment affirmed.
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HANDWORK and PIETRYKOWSKI, JJ., concur.
OhioApp. 6Dist.,2007.
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